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Incentive Efficiency Of Employee Grouping Based On The Preference And Ability

Posted on:2016-08-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X R KouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330461464242Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The study on traditional employee grouping with incentive efficiency was started from horizontal supervision,from the initial exploring of the conditions on the horizontal supervision to the inspection of the incentive efficiency,now it has been developed to the study on the problem of employee combination.The series of research puts forward the horizontal supervision maximization,studying a kind of personality characteristics.Most scholars choose the ability of employees as the main factor,only a small number of scholars choose the social preference of employees as the main factor.But a series of experiments and empirical studies have proved that there are other behavior psychological preference,risk appetite is very common psychological preference.This article is based on risk preference,considering both employee ability and social preference.The first part,assuming employees are risk neutral,is based on the study of Wang Yanmei and employee ability and social preference,establishing the enterprise total revenue optimization model.The employee is divided into homogeneous and heterogeneous based on different characteristics of employee,we can find the optimal way of employee grouping by comparing the enterprise total revenue of tow kind employee grouping.The main content is focused on the third chapter of this article.By comparing two kinds combination,we can draw:the employee’s ability and social preference is the main factors for enterprise when they choose the best combinations;No matter what employee’s ability,the total income of heterogeneous is the maximum;Regardless of the employee’s social preference,when the coefficient of the staff capacity is the same,the total income of homogeneous will become the maximum,the total income of low social preference are greater than the high social preference.The second part is based on the third chapter,it is assumed the the employees are risk neutral, it calculate the enterprise total return between homogeneous and heterogeneous combination.This part compares the result with the total income of the third chapter,discussing the effect of risk appetite incentive for employees. The main content is focused on the four chapter of this article.The comparison result show:when the employee’s ability is high,the enterprise total revenue of the risk neutral employee in heterogeneous is maximum;when the employee’s ability is low,the enterprise totalrevenue of no risk neutral employee in heterogeneous is maximum;No matter what employee’s social preference,the enterprise total income of risk neutral employees in heterogeneous combination is greater than the risk preference.To sum up,we can find that there are two kinds of the best combination ways,the first way is heterogeneous when the risk neutral employee’s ability coefficient are same and their social preference are low;Because the variables in the model are more,we can’t analysis the different of enterprise income between the employee’s ability.The employee’s ability is low,the enterprise total revenue of no risk neutral employee in heterogeneous is maximum,the employee’s ability is high,the enterprise total revenue of the risk neutral employee in heterogeneous is maximum.
Keywords/Search Tags:Ability, Social preferences, Risk appetite, combination incentive effect
PDF Full Text Request
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