The Consequence Of Controlling Shareholder Of Listed Company Assets Transfer Research

This article based on the controlling shareholder "Tunneling" phenomenon of listed companies in our country as the background, researching part of controlling shareholder "Tunneling" consequences of company internal and external factors. The article embarks from the controlling shareholder control. Study the relationship between the control of the controlling shareholder and the company’s performance. And analyze the impact of nature of state-owned enterprises. Subsequent to the controlling shareholder "Tunneling" cause a downturn of the listed company performance argument validation. And introduce the controlling shareholder control of the separation of two rights (separation) and cash flow right problem. Research of listed companies the largest shareholder in the case of two rights separation "Tunneling" consequences. On this basis, finally from the perspective of external audit and internal corporate governance study corporate governance mechanism of the influence of the "Tunneling" consequences.According to the existing research on the "Tunneling" behavior of controlling shareholders, this article from the theoretical point of view to explain its basic motive. Because of incomplete property rights theory, control and ownership of the controlling shareholder to produce separate in order to compensate for the controlling shareholder control costs and increase their residual claims, they were "Tunneling" acts of exploitation of control, so there is the most fundamental "Tunneling" motivation. Because enterprise incomplete contract theory and the theory of asymmetric information, other stakeholders are always insufficient evidence and get less information to curb the controlling shareholder of "Tunneling" behavior, which is the controlling shareholder of "Tunneling" behavior creating a fundamental condition.This article from the control of the controlling shareholder and the company’s performance, the influence of the two rights separation of "Tunneling", the influence of the external audit and internal governance mechanism of four Angle is put forward in this paper, the influence of four assumptions. The empirical results validate the assumptions in this paper. Finally, the empirical part of this article has carried on the robustness test.This article finally reached the following four conclusions:(1)There is a positive correlation between the proportion of control over the performance of the company controlling shareholders of listed companies; state-owned enterprises this phenomenon will be significantly weaker than the non-state-owned enterprises.(2) "Tunneling" behavior controlling shareholders of listed companies will make the company’s performance declined, if control rights and cash flow rights of listed companies are not equal, then the "Tunneling " so that the extent of the decline in the company’s performance will be greater, but the separation of ownership and size there is no obvious relationship between the performance and the degree of decline.(3) If the controlling shareholders of listed companies control rights and cash flow rights are not equal, then the external audit can inhibit the "Tunneling" of the consequences of the controlling shareholder, and the separation of ownership and the greater the degree of inhibition of the external audit of the more obvious; but if the control rights and cash flow rights are equal, the external audit of the "Tunneling" the consequences of no significant inhibition.(4) Internal governance of listed companies, the equity balance and independent director system is basically impossible to suppress the controlling shareholder of "Tunneling" cause consequences of declining performance; in the case of control rights and cash flow rights, ranging from the listed company’s executives can weaken incentives "Tunneling" of the consequences of the controlling shareholder.This paper presents the following four policy recommendations:(1) For individual investors should extra attention control structure of listed companies, and other receivables structure details of the project, to seek the two rights separation degree is low, high control and weak "Tunneling" phenomenon of potential investments.(2)Government or non-governmental organizations should provide the accounting firm is completely independent conditions to the audit of listed company, to enhance the general scale in the audit of listed company of voice. And strengthen the supervision of auditor and improve the auditor audit failure handling mechanism, in order to improve the quality of external audit (3) In view of our company internal governance mechanism of the "useless", Government regulators should improve the internal governance system construction, strengthen the protection of minority shareholders interests. (4) The government shall require listed companies to disclose information on the controlling shareholder in detail. Including the controlling shareholder control the ownership structure of listed companies, and ownership structure related information for the company. So that it can reduce the information asymmetry.