Investigate To Corporate Internal Governance On Voluntary Information Disclosure Quality

Publicity is medicine which can treat modern society and industrial ills, sunlight is the best antiseptic lighting is the best policeman. U.S. It is said in Justice Louis Brandeis’book. Facing the current financial scandals arised, although the securities regulatory authorities have introduced a variety of relevant laws and regulations to combat irregularities, but for now, not all listed companies are well complied with these regulations. Therefore, in order to enhance investor confidence and attract more investment, high-quality companies reveal information investors care about, and reach agreement with investors. Society is calling for effective information disclosure, it can ensure the capital market efficiently and healthy.Based on management and behavioral science theory, agency theory, asymmetric information theory and signal transmission theory, impression management theory and other theories, In this paper, we consider SME board listed companies as samples.From the perspective of shareholder governance, the governance of the Board, Supervisors governance and management incentives,this paper study the SME board listed company’s internal governance and voluntary disclosure quality correlation. First, we make an overview of the small board listed company, then based on the characteristics of small plates listed companies to explain the theory of internal governance and outline our current small board status of internal governance of listed companies, and then we analyse voluntary information disclosure from concept, measurement methods, characteristics. Based on the theoretical analysis, this paper reviewed the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website, GTA and other related websites or databases data, we do a descriptive statistics on listed companies in China’s current voluntary disclosure position and the quality of voluntary disclosure currently, followed by multiple linear regression, correlation analysis and robustness tests and other evidence to solve its internal governance impact. Based on the theoretical and empirical research, we draw conclusions from shareholders dimensions of governance, board governance dimension of Supervisors dimensions of governance and management incentive dimension.Finally, based on theoretical and empirical results, we propose enhancing the efficiency of board governance in order to achieve a win-win, play voluntary disclosure of the "signaling" effect and to avoid "independent director", "Audit Committee" becoming a listed company’s "rubber stamp" and other measures, the paper aims to improve the quality of voluntary information disclosure.