Study On The Effect Of Information Disclosure Quality On Enterprise Credit Financing

As an important part of the company’s internal control system, information disclosure mechanism is currently a hot research spot in the field of finance. With the deepening reform in China’s capital market, regulators are increasingly improving the intensity and scope about the information disclosure of listed companies. Listed companies disclose relevant information timely and truly, does the market can effectively react? Bank-based credit financing channels is an effective solution for the problem of financing constraints when the enterprises are in an developing process. But the problem of asymmetric information between funding supply-side and funding demand-side in credit markets severely reduces the efficiency of the optimal allocation of credit resources. Enterprise disclose high quality information, can it significantly reduce the information asymmetry between the two sides of the funding-supply and funding-demand, improve operating environment in credit markets, reduce adverse selection form banks and other financial institutions, and improve the efficiency of the credit contract?Based on the above background, this paper selects 2007-2012 Shenzhen A-share listed companies from the main board and small board as the study object, considering the objective reality in the credit markets, empirically test the effect of information disclosure quality on its banking financing mechanism and do further analysis under the specific system background in China. Conclusions of this study are as follows:(1) Financial and non-financial disclosure information are highly valuable, high quality of information disclosure through the signal transduction mechanism act on the credit market, which can effectively reduce asymmetric information between two sides of the funding-supply and funding-demand, significantly improve the capital protection of funding-supply side, and make the implementation of the credit contract more successful. High quality of information disclosure from funding-demand side would lead to a positive response to its credit markets:get more credit resources in the bank credit market, enjoy cheaper funding cost effectively, extend the life of the credit funds and significantly enhance the ability to obtain credit borrowings. (2) Requirement degree of bank credit decisions on information disclosure quality is significantly different when enterprises have different degree of nationalization. Because of the existence of soft budget constraint and the government’s recessive guarantee function, the political factors play an important role in the process of bank credit decisions on background of state-owned enterprises and effectively reduce the effect of quality of information disclosure on bank credit decision, which lead to the fact that compared with no state-owned enterprise, the correlation between state-owned enterprises’ information disclosure quality and its credit financing characteristics (availability of financing resources, financing costs, debt maturity and credit loan) is weaken, and the higher the degree of nationalization of enterprise is, and the greater this weaken effect is. (3) Requirement degree of bank credit decisions on information disclosure quality is significantly different when enterprises are in different degree of financial development markets. Good regional financial development environment can effectively promote the independence of the Banks and other financial institutions’ credit decisions and the marketability. Thus, compared with enterprises which are in the low level financial development region, the correlation between high level financial development enterprises’ information disclosure quality and its credit financing characteristics (availability of financing resources, financing costs, debt maturity and credit loan) will be effectively strengthened.