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Research On Central Enterprises’ Over-investment Governance Based On EVA Evaluation

Posted on:2016-03-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F WenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330467482468Subject:Financial management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Because of state-owned enterprises’special background, the existing owner absence and insider control problem, agency problem is more outstanding. According to statistics, the investment scale of state-owned enterprises has been high, but the investment efficiency is relatively low, vulgar growth problem is serious.In order to regulate the behavior of the SOEs, the SASAC decided to implement economic value added (EVA) performance evaluation system since January1,2010in the central enterprises, and since then, EVA instead of return on net assets, and profits (total) index in parallel as a general financial indicators, head of the state-owned enterprises operating performance evaluation, and given the weights are higher than profit highlight the core status of value. For state-owned enterprises, EVA is the target of such a high-profile, it focuses on equity capital cost, attaches great importance to the value creation, more in line with the general shareholders’ interests and the concept of sustainable development.The assessment method of EVA has been implemented more than four years in the central enterprises, EVA performance appraisal whether achieve the desired effect, this is one of the focuses of SASAC and business circles, academic circles In view of the evaluation system is relatively complicated, there are large difference between the specific economic environment, coupled with the effect is partly due to the lag of time, about the EVA performance evaluation mechanism for the management of state investment excesses effect how still need accurate empirical data support, and to give continuous attention.But it is important to note that the enterprises have different characteristics in different stages of development (e.g., strategy, organization, management, etc.), the investment demand and the severity of the problem of agency is also different, performance evaluation mechanism of the guiding role will also vary. So this article also examines the different life cycle stage of enterprise EVA performance evaluation mechanism about overinvestment inhibition. From the perspective of enterprise life cycle, and gradually perfect the assessment of differentiation, improve the precision of EVA appraisal with respect to have important theoretical and practical significance.The text is divided into six parts.The first part is introduction. This part of this article selected topic background and research significance, research framework and research purpose, research methods and innovation points were summarized in this paper.The second part is the literature review. This part summarized the performance evaluation, excessive investment, enterprise life cycle in domestic and foreign, and made a brief review.The third part is the definition, the related theories and hypotheses. Firstly, this part is about the concept and basic theory in detail, and then from two perspectives of static and dynamic, respectively expounds the EVA implementation effect of excessive investment mechanism and the differences of different life stages.The fourth part is the research design. This part first has carried on the outline to sample selection and data source, and then introduced the model of the inefficient investment, EVA and overinvestment correlation test model building and selection of relevant variables and basis.The fifth part is the empirical test and analysis results. This part uses all a-share listed companies as samples firstly, and using Richardson (2006) proposed by the residual error measurement model estimates the investment efficiency. On this basis, using the state holding listed companies as samples to measure the linear regression correlation with EVA and excessive investment, and found that the implementation of EVA has inhibitory effect on over-investment. Packet inspection, found that at the same time, based on life cycle in a mature enterprise compared with growth companies, EVA mechanism about overinvestment governance effect is easier to well implement. In addition, changing the generation of excessive investment and life cycle classification method is still come to the same conclusion, and confirmed the robustness of empirical results.The sixth part is research conclusion and policy suggestions. Through the empirical analysis conclusion, EVA has significant inhibited on excessive investment; Inhibition are different in different life cycle stage,. And based on this, the corresponding suggestions for improvement, and finally the prospect of research problems and the future study of this paper are expounded.In this paper, the possible innovation basically has the following points:(1) the research angle of view is relatively new. This article from the EVA, the perspective of enterprise life cycle, before and after the empirical analysis, comprehensive examine the implementation of EVA performance evaluation mechanism influence on enterprises investment behavior.(2) the sample data is more timely and practical. Considering the effect of the implementation of the new policy will typically laggard, a lot of real effect is not immediately apparent, therefore, this paper expand the sample selection, with state holding listed companies from2008to2012as the research object, the localization of inspection EVA application effect and put forward the feasible policy Suggestions, more practical value.
Keywords/Search Tags:Economic Value Added (EVA), over-investment, enterprise life cycle, central enterprises
PDF Full Text Request
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