| On October31,2009, China’s first batch of GEM companies successfully listed on the ShenZhen stock exchange. There are386companies listed successfully before December31of2013. Since the first batch of restricted stock company lifting the ban on the GEM executives reduction tide broke out in the fourth quarter of2010, the executives and sponsor cash holdings amounted up to2billion yuan. From2011to2013, the GEM executive holdings company from83to233. And the reducing times has totaled3688, with the amount reaching24.8billion yuan. Undoubtedly, frequent and large holdings is the reason of GEM index turning down.In recent years, the profound reasons behind the executives holdings of shares and how to make effective policy to regulation has become the focus of the industry theory and investment practice. In company governance structure of the GEM,’internal control" problems, equity balance degree is not obvious is the typical equity status quo. And due to the dominance status of the ownership structure of the GEM and corporate governance mechanisms, which exist in name of the general meeting of shareholders, minority shareholders legal protection system imperfect. Finally, it makes the net pay-offs behavior more rampant. In addition, equity incentive did have attract a lot of attention in the GEM companies as the main means of solving the agency problems and reducing the agency cost. In2010, there are only17companies which implement the equity incentive. By the end of2013, there were124companies implement equity incentive, involving1.7billion shares, this seems to be increasingly fierce tide formed the "echo". However, in recent years there have been scholars which have challenged the implementation of equity incentive effect. Those researches hold that the equity incentive don’t reduce the short-term behavior of the managers.In such cases, this paper attempts to investigate whether existing governance structure the GEM companies can curb executive positions significantly, and whether the implementation of equity incentive can effectively reduce the short-term behavior of the GEM executives. So, it is meaningful to analysis the executive holdings from the perspectives of governance structure and the equity incentive. And it has certain research significance:In theory, we want to find whether the existing governance structure in GEM companies is perfect or not, and the result of implementing equity incentive. And then that can really constraint executive behavior, reducing differences between executives’and shareholders’ interests. So this article can expand the research the view in terms of executive positions. In practical application, this article can provide advice about the perfection of corporate governance structure for the GEM and effective implementation of equity incentive policy. At the same time, it can offer valuable reference advice to investors, paying more attention to investor protection investment atmosphere, in order to enhance investor confidence in the capital market.At first, the interpretation of the current situation of reduction of GEM executives, then through the review of related literature, concentrated discussed from two aspects of governance structure and equity incentive executives reduce its motives. Beyond that, this article also explores whether the GEM company’s existing governance structure is reasonable or not and whether to have played an important role in supervision of executives. Equity incentive is to play its positive incentive effect and can restrain executive positions significantly. According to the results of the empirical study, we offer some advice on how to effectively supervise and regulate executive positions offer advice. This paper includes the following six parts:The first part is introduction, mainly introduced the selected topic background about the paper. This paper will research the problem of derivation, and points out the theoretical significance and practical significance. Secondly it will define the relevant concepts, including corporate governance structure, equity incentive and executives reduce holdings. Then, this paper briefly introduces the research contents and research methods. Finally it points out the innovation of the article.The second part is literature review, mainly from the following three big aspects reviewed the literature of executive holdings. The last is the literature review, summarizing the research findings of executive positions at the present stage, and lead to this article research view.The third part is the basic theory and the hypothesis, including "rational economic man" hypothesis of basic theory, principal-agent theory, insider trading theory and contract theory. Then according to the research content of this article, the paper hypothesizes effects on executive positions from two aspects of corporate governance structure and equity incentive.The fourth part is the research design. First of all, it introduces the composition and sources of data samples. Secondly, it introduces the selection of explained variable and control variables. Lastly, the empirical model was constructed.The fifth part is the empirical analysis, the first important variables for descriptive statistical analysis, and then variable correlation inspection, and regression analysis, according to the regression results for further optimization of the model, the robustness analysis.The sixth part is the conclusion and suggestion, summarizes the conclusion of this article, from the empirical results and in how to regulate and constrain the GEM executive positions put forward policy Suggestions.This paper uses the normative research and empirical research methods and concludes that:in the aspect of corporate governance structure, ownership concentration, the independent directors proportion, scale of the board of executive positions have certain inhibition and the effect is remarkable, but equity balance degree less inhibitory effect on the reduction of executives; In terms of equity incentive, the GEM in lower executive equity incentive plays an obvious role in reducing its amplitude, the greater the incentive intensity, the lower the amplitude of executive underweight, S(?)term behavior can restrain executives to a certain extent.The innovation of this paper is mainly manifested in four aspects:firstly, on the topic, the research objects of this article are GEM listed company executive. At present, about large shareholders and executives studies have appeared in succession at home, but almost all documents are for the domestic process of the reform of non-tradable shares, the current study of the GEM related is not much; Secondly, on the research angle of view, this paper combine the governance structure and equity incentive and explore its influence on the GEM executive positions. The target of it is to analysis the GEM whether perfect corporate governance structure, equity incentive measures whether presents the expected boost, and internal governance structure and the setting of equity incentive for the company to provide the reference; Thirdly, on the definition of equity incentive strength variable, this article adopts the ratio of executives holding amount and its salary amount to measure the equity incentive intensity. It is more able to depict the executives shareholding amount relative to the interests of the executive or the sensitive degree of income, compared to most domestic and foreign research on equity incentive effect to managers shareholding ratio as an indicator to measure the degree of equity incentive; Lastly, in study design, in the model2of regression, it introduces executive whether virtual variables for the company shareholders——mr. At the same time, the results found that executives who also works as major shareholders holdings range is bigger, also supply some suggestions on the position setting of the GEM executive. |
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