The Sustainability Of Specialized Cooperative’s C Iedit Cooperation Study Based On The Perspectiveof’property Drift’

The cultivation of FSC (farmer specialized cooperative) which organiz es farmers into the co-production is based on the underdeveloped econom y in rural areas and serves as an effective work in solving "three dimensi onal rural issues".Developing credit cooperation in rural financial market i s a concrete choice considering its underdeveloped financial system, the cr edit cooperation in FSC indeed makes a great contribution in promoting r ural modernization, urbanization, and mechanization in agricultural producti on. However, with different initial resources endowments among members in FSC,"property drift" is gradually emerging in FSC’s development whic h suffers the sustainability of credit cooperation in FSCBy the review of relevant literature and analysis on questionnaire sur vey data, this research shows the process that the general heterogeneity a mong FSC members leads to the "property drift" process, and the insuffic ient investment in credit cooperation. The shortage of investment further r esults its general members could not get their appropriate dividend finally, which disappointedly accelerates the "property drift" process to the core members and obstructs the development of credit cooperation.General members of FSC could change their bargaining power relativ e to the core members in the game of property by increasing their invest ment to FSC, and postpone the drift process shifting to core members. H owever the result is hinges on the coordinate of core members to its’gen eral members’investment in this game. Analysis on evolutionary property game between general and core members represents the game would achie ve ESS stability when general FSC members chose to invest while the co re chose to "grab". The prerequisite for ensuring sustainable development of FSC and its’credit cooperation is that the evolutionary game of proper ty between general and core must be positive-sum, which means both th e general and the core members could get their maximum value over any other options they could select.In this article, an organizational field centering on FSC organizatio ns is built to take FSCs into an institutional field. Sub-organizations, f ormal and informal policies and regulations are internalized to be the mandatory, imitative and regulated power that affects the sustainable de velopment of FSC and its’ credit cooperation. Concretely, policies and special funds from central and local government, financial support from RCBs(rural commercial bank), ABC(Agricultural bank of China), PSB C(Post Savings bank of China) and policy banks, trading relationship b etween other rural mortgage guarantee corporations, insurance companie s, micro-credit companies and FSCs, as well as the local social networ k and the exemplary role of "institutional entrepreneurs", are all make the impact on the sustainable development of FSC’s credit cooperation.