Pricing Strategy Of Third-Party Payment Platform Based On The Complex Networks

The third-party payment platform as a new form of enterprise organization has a wide range of users scale, the large growth of potential and highly commercial value. But nowadays, most of the third-party payment platforms have not providing service except the few which occupy almost all the market share. Therefore, exploring the third-party payment platform competition on the market strategies has an important practical significance to help companies compete in the market, and pricing strategy is the core issue of competition strategy.The third-party payment platform is a typical two-sided platform, the two-sided platform users’decision making behavior and interdependence of interests will form a complex interaction. Platform based on complex network perspective describes the dynamic evolution process can further reveal the operation and development of the law of the platform.However, the third-party payment platform is different from the traditional enterprise, its operation and development rule are difficult using traditional market competition theory to analyze. Although many domestic and foreign scholars have done extensive researches on the pricing problems of bilateral platform, including asymmetric pricing, multi-user pricing and attribution platform exclusive pricing, but limited by the game theory analysis framework, the existing literature on adaptive dynamic pricing and the critical mass pricing failed to conduct in-depth study. This paper introduces the dynamic market competition model of the third-party payment platform, arounding the platform pricing issue closely, analysis platform pricing strategy deeply and make relevant management recommendations.This paper analyzes the mechanism of the user network for the third-party payment platform competition in the market, reveal the significant impact on the characteristics of the network platform users to the result of market competition. Then using dynamic competition model integrates the complex network to study the third-party payment platform adaptive dynamic pricing and based on the angle of the critical user pricing. The reason to analysis these two pricing, because these two angles are center on two-sided users scale dynamic changes cause two-sided users’ effectiveness changed, launching by the theory of platform dynamic pricing.In the platform pricing analysis, we study the adaptive dynamic pricing, obtain the qualitative conclusions that dynamic pricing obtained significantly better than the static pricing, finding strong cross-network effects and prospective users can enhance the comparative advantages of dynamic pricing, moderate quality of service strengths and users benchmark help keep dynamic pricing advantage when changed the value of the main parameters of the model. Basing on the two stages of platform positive feedback mechanism initials, by studying the two-stage pricing, we obtain the two stages pricing strategy significantly improves the optimal platform for corporate profits based on the critical mass. We changes the main parameter values of the model, finding strong network effects and lower critical mass in favor of the two-stage pricing, moderate quality of service advantages and highly distributed index are conducive to maintaining the two-stage pricing advantage.This paper analyzes the calculation of pricing model, numerical results are based on matlab expansion. Firstly setting a specific parameter values calculated the relevant conclusions; Then change the values of the model parameters, and demonstrate that results of the study has no impact on parameters change; Drawing its influence on the optimal pricing strategy and its effect from the different values of the parameters, the conclusion can help the third-party payment platform managers develop the platform pricing strategy better.Finally, summarizing the research conclusions of the third party payment platform pricing, and put forward the lack of research and prospects for future research.