Public Investment And Political Mobility

Masses of tentative efforts have been conducted on exploring evidence from Chineseprefectural level cadres to demonstrate how political mobility is impacted by public investments.Viewing the literatures on political tournament, mandatory quota and public-goods-provisbnbias, there can be seen a multitasking evaluation system imposed by provincial or even centralgovernment Differentiated realistic meaning of public investments results in cadres’selectivetreatment to them. A database, covering all the party and government leaders from 283 Chinesecities, has been constructed. Thus the mobility and personal characteristic data required in thisresearch can be available range from 1999 to 2012, including 15 sub-provincial cities and 253prefectural level party secretaries. After matching data of economic performance and publicinvestments and with Multinomial Logit Model and LSDV model employed, both under robuststandard error, the influences from different public investment towards cadre promotion arediscussed, as well as the mediating effect of economic performances. In the nationwide level, although the relation between the transportatfcn investment andpolitical advancement is not that significant, the former can do contribute to promotion viaeconomic achievement. One the other, more emphasis on social investment would not contributeto cadres’promotioa Social investment impairs economic growth thereby the later can help lessin the lift. Respectively, transportation investment is good for cadres in middle China but actsconversely in the east However, in the estimation of these two regions, the mediator bothindicates positive pushes to cadre promotion which started form economic investment liketransportation input. To the environmental investment, the findings from east and middle regionare identical to that from the national level. On the contrary, for the party secretaries do notdependent on the economic performances to get a higher position in west China, the negativeeffect from social investment to economy turns out to be useful for them. Combined with all the argumentation, this research depicts how cadre mobility is impactedby public investment, sequentially posing a new visual angle for explaining the ubiquitousdistortion in public goods provision, i.e. centering more on infrasture constructure but dispising human resource cultivation and public service impovment. Besides, the current paper also responds to the dispute of political tournament according to the discussion above and deepens the multi-task evaluation system as a contribution to the illustration of promotion mechanism. Ultimately there have some feasible proposals to consummate the current jobs.