The Disclosure Of Accounting Information Of The Listed Company Based On Game Theory

Recently, the distortion of accounting information is revealed in high frequency in the context of China’s listed companies, the distortion of accounting information will not only harm the company operation, and also equity financing, but further goes against the overall economy development. From the company’s view, it is positive for the long-term development by choosing announce the authentic accounting information initiatively instead of passively, which is also the rule proposed and stressed by supervision department; meanwhile, the supervision department should enhance super intendance strength. Moreover, this problem is paid attention from home and abroad, this also call for the listed enterprises to emphasis on the operation management and structure adjustment, as well as law and regularity, to increase the quality of the distortion of accounting information.The study utilizes a game-theoretic model to analyze the distortion of accounting information in the context of listed companies, this method will benefit analyzing the start point of the distortion of accounting information strategy, further to bene fit the relevant policy formulation. Also, this study analyzes how stakeholders influence the quality of accounting information in the context of game-theoretic, as well as the decision making process. Based on the information above, this study proposes suggestions to solve the distortion of accounting information in different angles, like enterprise holders, supervision system, policy development, and so on. Once the distortion of accounting information is solved, the stability of China’s capital market would be improved, and also China’s overall economy development, this would further help listed companies to get support in terms of capital.