Under Different Ownership Structure Of Equity Incentive Effect On Performance Of Enterprise

Under modern enterprise system, shareholders and managers, respectively, have mastered the ownership and control of the enterprise, shareholders are the owners of the business but managers commissioned on behalf of business management-related business activities, is formed between the two "principal-agent" relationship. Principal-agent problems arise such that there is inconsistency between the interests of shareholders and managers, information asymmetries and other phenomena, so managers will be "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" behavior in the pursuit of maximizing their own interests in the process. To solve this problem, so the behavior of managers in line with the shareholders of the target, in addition to managers to implement the necessary supervision, also we need to give the manager the appropriate incentives to ensure that they maximize shareholder interests.He equity incentive in China has experienced rapid development, but because of China’s capital market is still not perfect, short-term incentives and cash of income-based incentives in domestic listed companies dominated, yet robust long-term incentive system is still restricting the development of domestic listed companies. In this paper, with reference to the relevant literature, with its "principal-agent" theory, incentive theory, governance integration theory, research as one of the long-term equity incentive not independent governance mechanisms have an impact on corporate performance, in order to achieve high efficiency incentives, need to be good corporate governance as the basis and premise, to achieve the optimal governance mechanisms. Therefore, choose 2010-2014 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies to implement equity incentive for samples to different ownership structure of listed companies in the background, equity incentive effect on corporate performance generated. The purpose of this paper is the difference by comparing the effect of different ownership structure generated equity incentive and guide the implementation of equity incentive related businesses more conducive to enhance the company’s performance under what circumstances, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the implementation of equity incentive to achieve long-term development. According to research needs, this paper is divided into six chapters, each chapter in part as follows:Part I:Introduction. This chapter introduces the research background and significance, research to determine the content and methods of defining the relevant concepts put forward this innovation.Part Ⅱ:Literature Review. This article related to the field of literature in this chapter from the equity incentive effect on the company’s performance in research and equity ownership structure and corporate performance-related incentive effects of the two studies were summarized. Finally, the reference to research literature analysis and evaluation.Part Ⅲ:theoretical analysis and assumptions. This chapter introduces the theory applied in this article, and accordingly the impact on corporate performance incentives and ownership structure from equity to equity incentive and corporate performance correlation of two hypotheses put forward in this paper.Part Ⅳ:study design. This chapter includes a selection of empirical data herein, variables used, description, and according to the research needs of this article, to build an empirical model.Part Ⅴ:An Empirical Analysis. This chapter focuses on the total sample, sub sample related variables descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, collinearity diagnostics, and multiple regression analysis, this article assumes that verification, the study interpret the results analysis, the final robustness check.Part Ⅵ:Conclusions, policy recommendations and limitations. Study conclusions drawn in this chapter, describes the results of the implementation of equity incentive and inspiration to enhance the company’s performance, the Institute concluded that limitations exist herein.The main conclusions of this study are:(1) equity incentive and corporate performance positively correlated to increase the proportion of managerial ownership, will help improve corporate performance; and equity property, ownership concentration, ownership balancing degree and no significant relationship between performance, also it confirmed that the starting point of this article, namely ownership structure are endogenous. The size of the control variables of the Supervisory Board Model 1 does not pass the test of significance may be due to the board of supervisors of listed companies exist in name only, but also did not play a good role of supervisory control, other control variables and corporate performance are significant relationship. (2) test results by the equity nature of the packet, in the non-state-controlled listed company equity incentive help to improve corporate performance, and in state-controlled listed companies there is no correlation between equity incentive and corporate performance. (3) different ownership concentration, correlation managerial ownership and corporate performance are also different, in the packet inspection, ownership concentration between 20%-40% of the company’s equity incentive and corporate performance at 10% significance on the level of positive correlation, while in dispersed ownership and absolute concentration, the equity incentive not well play a role, and there is no correlation between company performance relationship. (4) Due to the excessive concentration of ownership is not conducive to the implementation of the management equity incentive effect, and the balance of the equity to ten shareholders reflects the second largest shareholder of the degree of balance, and thus in the equity balance is greater than the company’s equity incentive 1 more conducive to improving corporate performance.Innovation of this paper is to empirically analyze the background of a different ownership structure, the use of packet inspection methods listed companies sample data grouping, which studies the correlation of equity incentive and corporate performance under different ownership structure between; in corporate performance the measure adopted on principal component analysis, a comprehensive measure of corporate performance, to avoid the possibility of one-sidedness of individual accounting indicators and easy to be manipulated.