Research On Agent Incentive Model Based On Relative Value Added And Short-term And Long-term Perfomance

The design of the incentive model is an important part of the salary operating contract management and also the focus of theory and practice community. The incentive model design is usually based on the principal-agent theory and incentive theory, with development of the market, the traditional principal-agent model has been unable to meet the needs of the client’s requirements.In the aspect of performance evaluation, net profit is usually used as the index which ignores the effect of economic conditions, industry conditions and other external factors. In the aspect of the basis of performance, the traditional model usually use the short-term performance which ignores the fact that some performance only can be seen after a period of time.Upon these considerations, we design the incentive model from the perspective of the relative value creation, selects relative EVA as the performance measure standard, take both long-term and short-term performance into consideration and then,expand the model to the dynamic range.According to the models, we get the following results:It is reasonable to use the relative EVA as the measure standard; It is necessary to take the long-term performance into consideration.; From a macro perspective, reducing trade monopoly surplus can improve operators’ level of effort; It is necessary to expand the model into multi-stage.This paper makes meaningful recommendations about the operators’ incentive mechanism design. Finally, this paper summarizes the research work (including the innovation and limitation of this article), and proposed future research prospects.