Senior Background,the Quality Of Accounting Information And Audit Fees

With the expansion of business scale and the increasing complexity of internal processes, managers’professional ability is got more and more attention,executives of listed companies often appear in accounting firm partner’s shadow.The important reasons for this phenomenon is the enterprise authorize auditor with extensive financial theoretical knowledge and solid practical experience, then the background of the executives of the firm can be a "barometer" of the enterprise management-the quality of accounting information what kind of impact? Whether the change of accounting information quality affects the audit fees of the external accounting firms, can the background of the executives reduce the relationship between accounting information quality and audit fees?In this paper, we use the theory analysis and empirical test to study the influence of the background of the senior executives on the quality of accounting information and the influence of the quality of accounting information on the audit fees.In the theoretical analysis, I introduce principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory and the theory of the top echelon, and organize the domestic and foreign research about the quality of accounting information and audit-related fees,then I proposes hypotheses.Then in the empirical research process,I choose 2011-2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed A-share companies as the sample. On this basis, we use the corrected Jones model to calculate the earnings quality, and to use the absolute value (DA) as a surrogate for the quality of accounting information.To compare the effects of different types of senior auditor background on the quality of accounting information and the mechanism of auditing charge.From the type of functions and job content two dimensions, the senior executives are divided into supervise type property senior executives,decision-making type property executives, supervising type non-property executives, decision type non-property executives four categories,and by collecting the database manually I sort the relevant data about audit background of different executives and Certified Public Accountants related cases.Through empirical research to obtain the following conclusions:(1) Increase in the number of auditors background executives will lead the company’s accounting information quality decline.(2) The quality of accounting information to reduce audit fees will increase the firm, indicating the firm’s risk premium or advice to buy the company played a role. (3) the office of executive background will weaken the quality of accounting information and audit fees negative relationship.(4)The effect of the correlation between the senior executives on the quality of accounting information and the correlation of the audit fees is not significant.Finally, on the basis of empirical conclusions, from the regulatory agencies, listing Corporation and accounting firms to improve the quality of accounting information I promote the company’s accounting information quality and promote the positive charge of the relevant recommendations. The research of this paper will help to clarify the mechanism of the corporate governance in corporate governance, improve the regulatory mechanism of the executive audit background, and provide the theory and data support for the accounting firms to audit the "cooling off period" and so on.