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The Release Of Policy Burdens With The Alteration Of Property Right Structure About Mixed Ownership

Posted on:2017-05-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H Q NiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330482973647Subject:Industrial Economics
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The third plenary session of the party’s eighteenth pointed out that," the key of comprehensive deepening reform is to develop mixed ownership economy of mutual integration", the goal of reform is to enhance the state capital function, increase its value and improve core competitiveness. The current economic development has entered a new stage of normal, and the macro environment urgently to look for dividends under the new reform, which require to speed up the pace of reform about state-owned enterprises, to release economic potential. In fact, the reform of state-owned enterprise property rights has become an important way of mixed ownership reform. However, theorists emphasize the policy burdens of enterprises can’t be eradicated by the reform of property rights, which lead enterprises face with soft budget constraint and make corporate performance face with limited space, so policy burdens become a stumbling block about the property right reform of state-owned enterprise to success. Thus, based on the perspective of policy burdens, the paper attempts to establish internal framework of property structure, which about the dual sides of "quality" and "quantity", we try to answer how the structure of quality affect policy burdens? Whether there are significant differences between the amount of different property rights and policy burden? How is the effect of interaction? Answer these questions become the basic starting point of this study.The effect of property rights is inseparable with the governance structure of external environment, especially the impact of the market mechanism and industrial competition. The process of market accelerates to the changes of property rights’ structure, so the mechanism between property rights and policy burdens may be change. The incentive effect of industrial competition promote to the optimal configuration in property rights’structure, so the effect between property rights and policy burdens may be better. On this basis, the idea of this study is arranged as follows:firstly, make a review of the theoretical literature on motivation of policy burdens, and then find the motivation to bear policy burdens from the perspective of government, enterprise and market. In addition, we fight to give a full explanation from political and economic view; secondly, through the diversity of property rights measure the respect of "quality" and the integration of property rights measure aspect the respect of "quantity", we test the mechanism between property rights and policy burdens, finally, we study the transmission mechanism of the external environment among them, including the market and competitive factors,By standardizing the research, draw the following conclusions.①In addition to the motivation of the political concept and managers’moral hazard to bear policy burdens, which is also limited by credit constraints, credit constraints are the economic motives of enterprises to bear policy burdens, and local enterprises are more vulnerable to the impact of credit constraints, thus bear a greater amount of policy burdens.②Property diversity help to reduce policy burdens, where the effects of state-owned shares become weaker and the inhibitory effect of other property become stronger. ③ When the market and competitive factors are introduced, we find that there is a substitution effect between market and mixed ownership, where market environment is better, the effects of diversity of property rights and degree of property integration are weaken. We also find that competitive industries promote a stronger property effect than monopoly industries.Compared to the existing literatures, on the one hand, this article reveals the economic motivation of policy burdens, which enrich existing research on the theory of policy burdens. On the other hand, the paper forms selection paths to counterbalance policy burdens. Namely, we can promote the reform about diversity of property rights, which improve the inhibitory effect about degree of non-state capital property integration. When the substitution between the process of market and diversity of property rights emerges, we can further to promote the reform of competition in the industry, which stimulates inhibitory effect about diversity of property rights and degree of property integration. In a word, we provide theoretical and practical tools of the property rights’reform about state-owned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:Diversity of property rights and degree of property integration, Credit constraints, The process of market, Industrial competition, Policy burdens
PDF Full Text Request
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