The Research On The Influence Factors Of Corporate Governance To State-owned Enterprises’ Inefficiency Investment

Recently, the sustainable development of enterprises has been troubled by a major problem that investment efficiency is not high. Most of the state-owned listed companies have developed into the "bottleneck" period, enterprises have been exploring the issue that how to seize the new situation of economic development opportunities so that enterprise economic can regain vitality. State-owned enterprises invested in inefficient way have many reasons, for example, a large number of state-owned enterprises retained earnings, a large shareholder rights first, executives "astronomical salaries," board of Supervisors useless. In recent years, many scholars rarely put the efficiency of investment and non-poor market regulation, and other external factors combined. But the focus will shift to the internal construction, and the economic consequences of the internal control have become a hot point. Because the concept of internal control is too general, and most of the empirical research literature have concluded that the internal control environment factors have a significant inhibitory effect on corporate inefficient investment. So this article from the corporate governance to study which measures can effectively improve company’s efficiency of investment.In this paper, the theoretical analysis based on asymmetric information theory and agency theory, finding that the agency problems and asymmetric information leading to intensification of the conflict between large shareholders, minority shareholders and managers, which resulting in inefficient investment business problems intensified. Corporate governance is emphasized the right balance between shareholders, between shareholders and managers of mutual constraints, the independent directors and the supervisory functioning, thus reducing the agency cost of enterprises, and ultimately improve the investment decision-making level of management. In the empirical part, we use the concentration of ownership, the proportion of the top three executive pay executives, the proportion of management shareholding and major shareholders equity ratio paragraph to quantify the corporate governance of enterprise. We use Richardson investment model to measure the actual level of investment, to build the four elements of the corporate governance as explanatory variables, with excessive investment and insufficient investment for the multiple regression model of explanatory variables. This research takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 2011-2013 board of state-owned non-financial listed companies as the object. The results showed that the harmony and stability of the corporate governance construction is helpful to improve the efficiency of corporate investment.Finally, from the results of this empirical testing we conclude that the corporate governance respectively through the power of large shareholders decomposition and management pay and shareholding ratio improved to suppress the corporate inefficient investment behavior. In general, the harmonious and orderly corporate governance can effectively improve the companies’ efficiency of investment. Farms with high-quality corporate governance are more inclined to make rational investment. At the same time puts forward some suggestions on the reform of state-owned enterprises in China, with a view to China’s economic transformation of listing Corporation to provide theoretical guidance, and promote the scientific management of state-owned enterprises faster.