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An Empirical Research On The Effect Of Executive Compensation On Internal Contral Information Disclosure In The Financial Industry

Posted on:2017-02-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330485469229Subject:Accounting
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Since 2006,our internal contral began requiring mandatory disclosure of information,the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued and launched“the Shanghai Stock Exchange Internal Control Guidelines”and “the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Internal Control Guidelines”respectively in 2006 and 2007.Whether in “the Shanghai Stock Exchange Internal Control Guidelines "" or “the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Internal Control Guidelines”,we can see the same situation:depending on the situation of company’s internal control, the Board of Directors should form the listed company’s internal control self-assessment report and the accounting firm should review evaluation comments recording to the company’s internal control self-assessment report. In 2008, "Internal Control Standards" published and require listed companies to begin full implement from July,2009, the disclosure of internal control information since entered a new stage. In recent years, China’s listed companies has made remarkable progress in the internal control system but there are still some problems, for example:internal control disclosure of information is too formal and contents are single, the quality of the internal control disclosure of information is lower.These promblems caused widespread concern with the relevant departments.Quality of internal control disclosure of information to shareholders and external information demand side is very important,it helps stakeholders understand the operating status and investment risk of listed companies to make the right decisions associated with investment in listed companies. For stakeholders,internal control disclosure of information can effectively reduce agency costs,avoid the moral hazard of executives,reduce financial fraud, strengthen the supervision of the executives,which significance is evident.Since the financial crisis in 2008,more and more people are concerned about the risk management and internal situation of listed companies, people’s requirements of the quality of the internal control of information disclosure gradually increase, which led the company’s shareholders to ponder how to better incentive executives to improve the quality of internal control information disclosure.In recent years,excutive compensation has been a controversial issue, especially inthe financial industry, the problem is particularly prominent, because the average executives’ compensation of the financial industry rank at the top every year among all industry.On the one hand, the majority employees doubted whether the executives’ compensation is too much and proportional to their actual job performance or not., on the other hand, management itself is also under a lot of pressure, shouldering more responsibility than employees.we shoulid look at this problem of dialectical, for shareholders, there is a positive meaning to carry out incentive compensation of senior management, because to a certain extent, incentive can reduce agency costs, motivate executives’ potential. At different stages of development of the company, for the company’s specific circumstances and personal needs of executives, company often require different incentives. In the end what kind of incentives is the most effective and can better stimulate executives to improve the quality of information disclosure of internal control is the focus of our artical.We take 2009--2014 A-share listed financial companies as samples to explore whether executive pay incentives can improve the quality of information disclosure of internal control effectively or not, and to analyze the differences between different ways of compensation incentives to influence the information disclosure of internal control. Finally,according to the nature of ownership of listed companies to classify, we explore if executive compensation pay different effects on the quality of information disclosure of internal control beween State-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company.
Keywords/Search Tags:financial listed companies, short terms of executive compensation, long terms of executive compensation, information disclosure of internal control
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