A New Way To Solve Problems Of Insider Control Of Listed Companies In China

Insider control problem is accompanied by establishing modern enterprise system, ownership and operation of separate in corporate governance. As the corporate governance of listed companies is relatively perfect enterprise organization form, whether the insider control problem regulated effectively is the important measure to inspect the governance structure of listed companies. In our country, due to the existence of a series of problems such as the incomplete property right system, company ownership structure imbalance, lack of external governance, insider control problem becomes a common phenomenon in listed company governance in our country. And it becomes the key factors that hinder the perfecting of governance structure of listed companies and the healthy development of capital market in China.About how to solve the problem of insider control, the traditional practice is to perfect the company ownership structure, to establish the independent director system and the board of supervisors, to strengthen the incentive measures from the angle of internal governance. The idea of " to take stopgap measures " has little effect in practice. Insider control problems are the result of insider control, the listed company as a public company, the first step of the governance structure is to realize the balance of internal and external coordination management. Therefore, the introduction of external balances mechanism may be the solution of the problem to limit insider control. The research of the idea to solve the problem of insider control of listed companies in our country is based on the logic.In this paper, the structure of the arrangement is as follows: the first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter presents the issue of corporate governance structure and insider control of relevant theoretical basis, discussing the formation of the insider control problem and the necessity of governance on the theory. The third chapter introduces the practice of developed countries in regulating insider control problem, and getting some experiences. The fourth chapter is about the type of insider control of listed companies in our country and the analysis of the status. Through by the end of 2014, the data of 1527 private listed company’s equity structure and the attending of general meeting of shareholders, the author analyses the internal status of insider control of listed companies in our country. Through the 2006-2014, the data of institutional investors, merger and reorganization in our country’s capital market, the analyses the external situation of insider control of listed companies in our country. The fifth chapter analyses the reasons for the formation of insider control of listed companies in our country from an external perspective, which laid a foundation for this measures to be put forward. The sixth chapter is about a case about Competition between Bao and Wan, which teaches us how to inhibit the governance of insider control, that is to introduce the external experience and enlightenment. The seventh chapter is relevant recommendations. From the viewpoint of introducing external balances mechanism, it proposes some relevant measures to solve the problem of insider control of listed companies in our country.