An Empirical Study Of The Relationship Between Managerial Ownership And Stock Returns Of The Listed Corporation

Asymmetric information theory and principal-agent theory have been the pillar in the field of management theory, and they are the cornerstone of principal-agent problems in enterprises. Scholars at home and abroad prefer to solving the contradiction from the perspective of executive compensation system. And since the 1990 s, equity incentive tide a study lifts in the field of study abroad. Although capital market in China is much less than the developed countries, such as the U.S., but with the development of capital markets in recent years and the continuous improvement of the regulatory system, equity incentive is of great teoretical and practical circles attention as an important measure of corporate governance. And a lot of researchers regard it as a part of the executive compensation system, studying the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise value, and less studying the equity incentive from the perspective of the cost of financing and investment benefit. This paper tries to explore qualitative research from the latter perspective.This article mainly embarks from the incentive view, based on asymmetric information and principal-agent theory, studying the relationship between a listed company’s executives’ shareholding and the stock returns, and studying the large shareholders’ equity concentration and ultimate control properties how to affect the relationship above. Putting the corporate governance measures of listed companies in dynamic capital markets to understand, it is helpful to better know the relationship above, so that listed companies can more accurately estimate the cost of financing, and they can use the research on the relationship to make value appreciation through investment activities. It has important meanings in theory and in practice.Through to reading the domestic and foreign literature reviews, based on the analysis of the asymmetry information theory and the principal-agent theory, this author puts forward the research hypothesis, selects datas from 2003 to 2015 of China’s A-share listed companies, using the data processing method of both Fama and French(1992; 1993), and sets up the research model to do empirical study on the relationship between the listed company’s executives shareholding and the stock returns, then displays the empirical argumentation through the descriptive statistics analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and so on, in order to get more reliable results.And the empirical results show that, the listed company’s executives sharesholding indeed has a significant positive impact to the stock returns, but not its stake the higher, the impact is more significant. In addition, the large shareholders ownership of listed companies has the significant negative role to the relationship above, that is, the higher the major shareholders holdings, the relationship between the executive shareholdings and stock returns is weaker, the stronger conversely. Compared with the state-owned enterprises, the positive relationship between executives’ shareholding and stock returns in non-state-owned listed companies is more significant.Finally, in the text at the end, based on the empirical results, the research conclusions and policy suggestions, weakness of this research and prospect are summarized.