Research On The Influence Of Ownership Structure Over Cost Stickiness

Traditional management accounting consider that cost and volume of business present a linear relationship, and the cost varies with the amount of traffic. But in recent years scholars at home and abroad found that it is not a simple linear relationship between cost and volume of business. The increase in the cost of business volume is greater than the amount of reduction in the amount of business to reduce. This phenomenon is academically named Cost Stickiness. The existence of cost stickiness is a challenge to the traditional cost management. In view of the importance of cost management to the enterprise, the causes of the Cost Stickiness and its influencing factors have become a hot research topic in recent years. On Cost Stickiness causes, the most mainstream view is from the contract concept, efficiency concept and opportunistic view three aspects to explain, and that opportunism view is the most important factor. Self-motivation drive management in the face of a decrease in the amount of business reluctant to cut related resources and costs caused by the viscous layer. The appropriate ownership structure can restrain and motivate management, restrain the opportunism of management, and then have the potential to restrain the degree of cost stickiness. Based on this, this article from the perspective of ownership structure, the paper study the nature of beneficial controlling owner, ownership concentration and management of three aspects of the impact of the Cost stickiness.The structure of this paper is as follows: The first chapter is the background and significance of the paper, the structure and arrangement and research methods; the second chapter introduces the ownership structure tack on charges of domestic foreign literature and commentary; the third chapter is theoretical analysis and hypotheses part of the cost of the existence and ownership structure tack on charges theoretical analysis and hypothesis; the fourth chapter is the study of design, according to the previous chapter proposed hypotheses, build models and define variables, select and filter data; the fifth chapter is empirical analysis, using statistical software sample data descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and concluded; sixth chapter is the conclusion according to the foregoing summary of the content of proposed findings and put forward policy recommendations. Finally, insufficient research has been described herein, it proposed future research directions.This paper uses China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listing Corporation data from 2009 to 2014, found that:(1) China’s listing Corporation commonly prensent Cost Stickiness;(2) The state-owned listed company charges more serious degree of stickiness, because there are more serious agency problems of state-owned enterprises;(3) Listing Corporation ownership concentration level is higher, the lower the level of cost stickiness, that ownership concentration can proxy issue on the company’s play a certain role in mitigation;(4) The proportion of managerial ownership is higher, the lower the degree of cost stickiness, managerial ownership can alleviate the agency problem of the company, then the Cost Stickiness have certain inhibition.According to the results of empirical research, this paper puts forward the following several policy implications:(1) The departments of supervision on the state-owned enterprise of our country should intensify supervision of state-owned enterprises, it is responsible for the operation of state-owned enterprises managers and on behalf of the state to the enterprise implementation of the rights of shareholders agent design a set of perfect supervision and performance appraisal system;(2) The equity dispersion company can inhibit the self-interest behavior of the management by means of the appropriate concentration to raise equity;(3) China’s listed companies should be attention to managerial ownership as incentives to alleviate the agency problem role, make management holds a stake to inhibit the opportunistic behavior of the management.