Study On The Influence Of Managers Incentive On The Allocation Efficiency Of Internal Capital Market From The Perspective Of Double Agent

Internal capital market refers to the enterprise each segment of internal funds can be used to produce market competition, is the enterprise capital allocation platform. Reality, within the group there is a double agent and asymmetric information, conflicts of interest between shareholders and company group headquarters CEO as well as the headquarters of the CEO and general manager of division between affected the normal operation of the internal capital market. The important way of incentives to address the double principal-agent problem in headquarters and branch manager CEO, this kind of incentive can improve the efficiency of internal capital market is the corporate governance need to address the important issue. Considering to the fact that China’s current business agency problem and information asymmetry problem, to double principal agent as the research angle of view, analyzes the headquarters CEO incentives and branch manager incentive effects on the efficiency of internal capital market.In this paper, we first use normative research methods to analyze and collate the relevant literatures at home and abroad, and analyze the relevant theories. And then use empirical research methods, the research hypotheses are discussed in the paper. In the empirical research, this paper selects 2010- 2014 41 "Department of family enterprise" its 174 A-share listed companies as a sample, adjusted profit sensitive coefficient method is used to measure the internal capital market allocation efficiency. The effects of aspects of the internal capital market allocation efficiency are studied from two aspects: the CEO incentive and the branch manager’s incentive. Empirical study shows that:(1) management(Headquarters CEO and general manager of division) compensation incentive and internal capital market allocation efficiency positive correlation;(2) management(Headquarters CEO and general manager of division) equity incentive and internal capital market allocation efficiency no significant relationship;(3) branch manager by headquarters to allocate capital incentive and internal capital market allocation efficiency positive correlation;(4) the manager’s compensation incentive effect is inverted U-shaped change with increase of the number of segments.The innovation of this paper lies in:(1) the existing literature only from the angle of division manager to influence allocation efficiency of internal capital markets. Have less influence on internal capital market allocation efficiency of the article from the headquarters and branch manager CEO incentive study.(2) on the incentive way, taking into account headquarters capital allocation for high-efficiency department manager and low efficiency of department manager working enthusiasm, the incentive salary incentive and equity incentive as a supplement, together with the study of influence of internal capital market allocation efficiency by the division headquarters capital allocation, the research content further. The factors influence on deep research on the impact of the efficiency of internal capital markets provide new evidence and referential significance for the optimization of the enterprise group management incentive.