The Guarantee、Auditing Fee And Auditing Opinion

With the continuous expansion of the scale of external guarantee, the risk of listing Corporation is also increasing, which has a serious impact on the effectiveness of the capital market, the optimal allocation of resources and the protection of investors. External audit as an external governance mechanism, which can ease principal-agent problem and reduce the degree of asymmetric information. To a certain degree the certified public accountants can inhibit the excessive guarantee through audit opinions issued by exposing risks brought by the external guarantee, it also can alleviate the agency problem and protect the interests of investors.however, auditing opinion purchasing behavior occurred frequently in recent years, it is increasingly received attention of academia and regulatory authorities, company management influence and manipulate the auditor decision through auditing opinion purchasing behavior, in order to obtain good for themselves but low quality audit opinions, which reduces the quality of accounting information, disrupt the capital market and harm the interests of the broad masses of investors and other stakeholders. Management may induce the CPA by increasing the audit fee.In order to maximize their own interests, the CPA may also provide the audit opinion that the listing Corporation wants to.They play games and may be in collusion with each other. But is there an inevitable connection between external guarantee, audit fee and audit opinion? Whether the audit fees which have a moderating effect are related to external security and audit opinion? These are what this dissertation studies.This article is divided into five parts. The first part is introduction, introduces the research background of this article, research significance, research methods and innovative ideas, and reviewed the related literature. The second parts is the theoretical basis of this article, defining the relevant concepts of the research object and elaborate the theory of principal-agent, the theory of economic man hypothesis, Information Asymmetry theory, Game theory and so on. Then the third part is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis, describes the status of external guarantees of our country, and discuss how the guaranty affects the audit opinion, as well as the adjustment influence of audit fee level and on the basis of the above, the third puts forward the hypothesis of this article. The fourth part is empirical research, this paper selects 5487 observations from 2008 to 2014 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock Exchange as the research sample, using logistic regression method to test the hypothesis proposed in the third part, and results show that:for the listed companies of large scale of external guarantee, external guarantee and non-standard audit opinion is positively related, however pay higher audit fees will reduce the correlation of guarantee and the non-standard audit opinion. Thus, due to the need for external guarantee, company management provides higher audit fees, and affects the audit independence. Finally, the improvements are suggested from Accountant Company, listed company and regulator on the empirical conclusions.