| In recent years, with the rapid development of P2 P network lending platform, it is playing the important role in meeting the demand of all sectors of society for capital, at the same time, there are a lot of problems appearing. A lot of network lending platforms go bankrupt and take cheat action, even abscond, which has a negative impact on market development of P2 P network lending platform. Therefore, further study of related theory and timely policies of government are very necessary.This paper mainly focuses on analyzing the price and regulation of P2 P network lending platform. on the respective of pricing, this paper established pricing model in different market structures and with different charging methods to analyze how the various factors affect the price that maximizes profit of the platform. as well,this paper provides a theoretical basis on implementing asymmetric pricing to investors and borrowers of this platform. By using Lerner index,the paper analyzed monopoly pricing power of the platform and judged whether platform a strong market power. The result of the welfare analysis showed the existent of user integrated network will increase welfare of the whole society. The result also showed that P2 P network lending market existed excessive competition. on the perspective of regulation of the P2 P network lending, the paper decided analysis on regulation into two parts: the risk of platform pricing and platform pricing. on the perspective of regulation on the P2 P network lending,the paper divided analysis on regulation into two parts: regulatory risk analysis of operating mode and regulatory analysis of platform pricing. On the one hand, the former classified operating mode of the platform. on the other hand, it described the appearing alienation problems that leads to a number of risks in the development process of platform in China. on the basis of analysis of risk, the paper takes some corresponding suggestion to regulation. For regulation of platform pricing, the paper first analyzed a few features that appeared in the platform to judged whether it needs regulatory authorities to intervene and then take some regulatory suggestion on excessive competition of P2 P network lending market.By the research,conclusions as follows :(1) after using SCP analysis model to analyze P2 P network lending market,the result is that the market concentration ratio of P2 P network lending market is very low.According to the method of market structure classification created by Zhicaoyi, it can concluded that P2 P network lending market belongs to decentralized competitive market that has the lowest concentration ratio. Barriers to entry this market is low, as long as a certain number of funds, enterprises can enter the market, which leads to a large number of homogenous platforms exist in the market and the competition between platforms is excessive.(2) by analyzing the development of the domestic P2 P network lending platform operation models, it can find that the domestic P2 P network lending platform appears many aberrant problems that business of P2 P platform turned to the scope of financial institutions, but no corresponding regulatory measures are taken which leads to various risks in the business of P2 P platform and disrupt the normal financial order at a certain.(3) By establishing different types of P2 P network lending platform pricing model of different market structures different ways to charge, it found the main factors that affect profit-maximizing price of the platform,such as integrated network externalities between external users, users’ price elasticity of demand, the rate of successful match,the number of transaction in this platform, the level of differentiated products or services of the platform. And it found a theoretical basis on implementing asymmetric pricing for the P2 P network lending platform. The comprehensive network externalities of Investors towards borrowers is better than borrowers towards Investors.Then, by using Lerner index,it judged whether the platform has a monopoly pricing power and found that monopoly pricing power of P2 P network lending platform pricing was limited by users’ integrated network externalities. Finally, the paper analyzed the welfare of competitive transaction pricing platform,and found the total social welfare of the platform is in direct proportion to users’ integrated network externalities.The less different platform is, the bigger number of homogeneous platform on the market and the more intense competition will be. Thus, social welfare of the platform will produce a large fluctuation. |
