Information Violation Disclosure Of Listing Corporation:Based On The Perspective Of Corporate Governance

With the enterprise information disclosure requirements are constantly improve in China, listed company’s governance enhances a timely, completely and objectively disclosure in important information, however, violations of the disclosures are often occur. Therefore, the illegal information disclosure behavior still need to be further discussed.In the perspective of corporate governance, this paper based on the case studies and empirical analysis, trying to investigate the listing corporation illegal disclosure behavior. Firstly, in the case of ST Bo-Yuan, the company for four consecutive years of illegal disclosure, in 2015 has become the first company to delisting. By analyzing the internal governance and weak executive’s behavior, to reveal the company related governance issues of illegal information disclosure. Further, based on the occurrence of illegal disclosure of ST Bo-Yuan, this paper adopt the empirical test, from the aspects of ownership structure, executive power and board structure of the company, to quantitate the effects of various dimensions to the illegal disclosure of listing firm, to draw more general conclusions for Chinese corporation, avoiding the limitations brought from individual case analysis.This study found that the illegal information disclosure of ST Bo-Yuan was result from some aspects of internal corporate governance problem. Several restructuring conducted company’s controlling shareholders did not stable, and caused internal staff from top to bottom became strong self-interest; weak corporate governance makes the management can beyond the internal control constraint and manipulated information disclosure, which provides ways and means for illegal information disclosure. The empirical evidence also support the above conclusions, executive power will lead to more likely to make illegal information disclosure, and the size of director board brings a positive impact on information disclosure. However, from the large sample, the higher proportion of controlling shareholder in the Chinese listing firm can lead more binding with the interests of the company, in order to avoid the company’s share price collapse after the discovery of the illegal information disclosure, they will reduce the possibility of illegal disclosure.This paper provides relevant suggestions to strengthen the information disclosure quality from the perspective of corporate governance, and also provide relevant supporting evidence, to evaluation the listed corporation governance to illegal information disclosure behavior constraints and to reveal the improvement direction for future supervision system.