The Influence Of Control Right On The Performance Of M&A

Merger and acquisition has been one of the hottest topics in the capital market. Especially since the financial crisis, China’s M & a market has entered a new round of active period. This aspect is caused by the government’s macro-control, on the other hand, is also the inevitable result of China’s industrial transformation and upgrading. And then the effect of mergers and acquisitions, the company’s M & A behavior can be recognized by investors in the capital market? This article is based on this background, on the basis of domestic and foreign scholars, through the collection of M & a event in the event study method to analysis the relationship between control rights and the performance of mergers and acquisitions.This paper examines the relationship between control rights and the performance of mergers and acquisitions from three dimensions: enterprise property rights (state-owned enterprises and private enterprises), the proportion of the first largest shareholder, the proportion of state-owned shares. Firstly, from the angle of the property right of enterprise property inquiry on M & a performance on enterprise property; secondly from the perspective of the first largest shareholder shareholding ratio. Control on M & a performance impact. Finally from the recent economic reform and the new direction of mixed perspective of ownership of, the study of Chinese companies is the relationship between the proportion of equity and M & a performance. To measure the performance of mergers and acquisitions, and the traditional practice, this paper based on the perspective of market investors to measure the performance of mergers and acquisitions.This paper selects 325 mergers and acquisitions as the research object from 2010 to 2014, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to measure the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Through the empirical analysis, it is found that the nonlinear relationship and short-term private enterprises M & a performance compared to, the state-owned enterprises in the short term mergers and acquisitions performance lower; through the presentation of the first major shareholder shareholding ratio and short term performance of mergers and acquisitions (inverted "U" relationship can be seen, the major shareholder of the company control with the "hollowing out" motivation and support motivation ", in the inverted" U "type curve inflection point on the left," to support the motivation is dominant, and in the right point, "tunneling motivation" occupies the dominant position. In addition, the proportion of the shares of the company in China is inversely proportional to the short-term performance of mergers and acquisitions, mixed ownership structure can significantly enhance the short-term performance of mergers and acquisitions.Conclusions from this study can be seen, a decisive role in the economic operation needs to respect the market in the allocation of resources, the government should do service duties and not interfere with the operation of the economy; low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises should be to accelerate the process of China’s state-owned enterprise reform; perfect corporate governance mechanism to prevent of the company’s largest shareholder "tunneling, to perfect the legal protection system of medium and small investors.