Research On The Impact Of Ownership Structure On Cash Dividend Policy In China’s GEM Listed Corporation

Dividend policy is the result of benefit gambling between major shareholders and minor or middle shareholders, between shareholders and creditors, between shareholders or creditors and company managers. It is also a signal tool of much information about operation, management, and finance in listed corporations. Accordingly it is always highly concerned by capital markets and scholars. Foreign scholars started to research on dividend policy earlier, and they have already formed a large number of theories and genres. The Chinese scholars have little researched on dividend policy of the listed corporations in China growth enterprise market(GEM), but have researched on dividend policy of the listed corporations in the main-board market from many aspects, such as financial characters, life cycle, policy factors and so on. On the one hand, most of the China GEM Companies are private enterprises, moreover most of them are controlled by family businesses or persons. On the other hand, since the establishment of the GEM market, it is increasingly popular that the private equities(PE) or venture capitals(VC) foster and invest startups or listed corporations in GEM. Furthermore, management equity incentive of the listed corporations is also increasingly popular. Because each side has its own shareholding motivations and interests, in addition to the impact of policy factors, the dividend policy of the listed corporations in GEM becomes more interesting.This paper regards panel data for annual cash dividend distribution of the listed corporations in GEM from 2009 to 2014 as subjects in this study. And from the perspective of ownership structure, this study uses many methods, such as logistic regression analysis, multiple linear regression analysis, and so on. And according to the needs of research, this article selects six variables, including Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, equity balance coefficient, private equity shareholding ratio, public fund shareholding ratio, management shareholding ratio, proportion of restricted shares, as the independent variables. At the same time, the study selects two variables, including willingness to pay cash dividends, cash dividend payment level, as the explained variables. In order to find the relationship between ownership structure and cash dividends policy. The research results show that the ownership concentration of the listed companies in GEM has not very significant impacts on willingness to pay cash dividends, but has negative correlation with cash dividend payment level. And they also show that equity balance degree of the listed companies in GEM has not very significant impacts on willingness to pay cash dividends, but has negative correlation with cash dividend payment level. Because most of the listed companies in GEM are small or medium-sized enterprises that de-veloped from the family business, the check and balance function of non controlling shareholders to controlling shareholders is very weak. About the cash dividend policy, non controlling shareholders have a tendency with the controlling shareholders’ will. The research results also show that public fund has not very significant impacts on cash dividend policy, but private equity has significantly negative correlation with cash dividend policy. Because private equity participation in the company’s business is higher than the public fund. And that management shareholding ratio has significantly negative correlation with cash dividend policy.And that proportion of restricted shares has significantly positive relation with cash dividend policy.According to the research conclusion, this paper proposed to strengthen the supervision of the interests of major shareholders of the listed corporations. And this paper also sugested that the listed corporations should actively introduce external mechanism, in order to improve governance structure and to play the role of non controlling shareholders, and to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Additionally, this paper proposed that institutional funds, in particular, the public fund investors, should pay close attention to the longterm development of enterprises, and actively participate in major business decisions, and play the advantages of institutional investors.There is also a suggestion that governments should strict implementation of the stock limited system, and increase the penalties for illegal cash.At last, this paper offers a proposal that the governments and the listed corporations should regulate the system of executive stock ownership incentive.