Impact Of Executive Salary’s Viscous Characteristics On Financial Investment Making In CSCL

The senior executives’ salary is an effective method to solve the principal–agent problem of modern enterprise. Essentially, this is an incentive mechanism, the main purpose is to promote the enterprise value and maximize stockholder’s wealth. Therefore, the performance salary system is considered to be the most impeccable one, and it is the first choice of listed company. In 2007, after seven years, the executive compensation of listed companies in our country increases unceasingly, the situation and the worldwide downturn in economic conditions and enterprise declining performance is inconsistent, this also means that type performance salary system has lost the original constraint function, it is just a kind of incentive tools, which is why "sticky" executive pay will occur. So far, the study of this problem has made many achievements, but most of these studies superficial, analyzes its existence, rather than the consequences of this phenomenon.From 2007 to 2014, the remuneration of senior executives was increasing, but the economic environment was extended downturn. It means the binding cation of performance salary is not working, it is only the incentive mechanism, and breeds the viscous of the se nior executives’ salary.Investment is an important financial behavior among the business activities, and the efficiency of investment relates to the survival and development. The frequent overinvestment behavior not only leads to the broken of capital chain but also affect the optimal allocation of social resources, especially the financial industry. In hence, this paper discovers the influences of financial investment by the viscous of the senior executives’ salary in CSCL.This paper studies the transaction size, P&L situation and the change of senior executives’ salary of CSCL from 2007 to 2014, in order to analyze the relations among the senior executives’ salary, net margin, operating profit and the variable profit and loss of fair value. In view of the fair value in China’s new accounting standards system is widely used in the background, the author will be divided into two kinds of enterprise performance, is a kind of risk, the other is the business performance, and the comparative study on executive pay and the sensitive degree of different risk performance, and from the system of executive compensation for executives the characteristics of financial asset investment behavior rules to find the investment behavior of the direct management.