A Study On The Relationship Between Controlling Rights Allocation And Performance Of China’s Small And Medium Listed Companies

Since separation ofbusiness ownership and managementownership, creating that the modern enterprise is no longer claimed as one unique company owners, enterprise control exists in the stakeholders of enterprise management(shareholders, board of directors, management).The mode of control configuration in the internal enterprise gradually became one of the key factors to improve corporate performance and business performance.Nowadays in china, small and medium-sized enterprises have an extremely important role in the national economy, creating 60 percent of GDP,50% of the tax per year.Small and medium-sized enterprises have been the core driving force in promoting social innovation and economic.So it is important to pay more attention to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Most of the studies are focusing on the external financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.But the imperfect of control over the configuration of small and medium-sized enterprises is the internal reasons in restricting the development.Therefore, this paper analyzes three levels of control configuration in theory including the shareholders, board of directors, managers control. Then through scientific and reasonable division, integration of comprehensive control allocation model is put forward. This paper combines the actual data of small and medium-sized enterprises listed companies small plates of 734 companies.The study using the total return on assets as a performance indicator,firm size and asset-liability ratio as control variable,this paper from the perspective of empirical studies the relationship between the control configuration of listed companies in small and medium-sized enterprises status and the operating performance.The results show that, in the shareholder level of control right allocation, before a critical point, the proportion of the largest shareholder and business performance is positively correlated.However,after the critical point,the correlation is negative. In the board level of controlling right allocation,the relative balance board of directors on the business performance has a significant positive correlation.In the managers level of controlling right allocation, the effect of relatively independent managers on business performance remains to be further empirical research.The type of controlling right allocation in small and medium-sized enterprises in China listed companiesto make the best business performance is the proportion of the largest shareholder from 30% to 50%, balance board of directors, independent managers. In order to improve the company’s operating performance,small and medium-sized enterprises can learn from this type of listed companies according to the situation of the company.