Game Mechanism For Mobile Agents And Vaccination Behavior Under Complex Network Structure

Over the past few years, complex network science has attracted a lot of concern in many fields since it emerged, and become an interdisciplinary research area. At the same time, evolutionary game theory is also greatly concerned, and it provides a powerful theory tool to solve some of social dilemmas. Among them, the collective cooperation behavior on complex networks has made considerable progresses, and social dilemmas have also been understood in depth, thus more effective ways are proposed to solve these issues. Meanwhile, the analyses and studies of epidemic dynamics have become an active point within the academic communities. Complex network and evolutionary game theory are often combined to further deepen the understanding of epidemics and vaccination dynamics.According to the theory of complex network, in this thesis, the system modeling and simulation is utilized to study the influence of individual game strategy on group cooperative behavior on complex network, and the role of social information and the difference of individual fitness during the evolution of epidemic behavior is also explored. The main innovative works are illustrated as follows:(1)To investigate the influence of strategy update order on public goods game with the mobility of individuals. When individuals are dissatisfied with current earnings, there are two options: one is to change the game strategy, the other is to move to a new site, which is not occupied by other agents. Through a great quantity of simulations, the results show that when different strategy update orders are taken, the collective cooperation behavior is much more different, which can help us to more fully understand the cooperative behavior among complex structured populations.(2)To explore the evolution of cooperation behavior in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment. In this model, each individual has a random reputation value, and they are divided into two types based on the threshold of reputation value. Since the reputation value changes according to the strategy of individual in the game, the types of individuals evolve over time. Large scale numerical simulations indicate that the adaptive reputation assortment mechanism can significantly promote cooperative behavior and improve the level of public cooperation. At the same time, the adaptive reputation assortment is conducive to the formation of strong cooperative clusters among the population to resist the invasion of defectors.(3)To discuss the effect of social information and individual heterogeneity on voluntary vaccination behavior and the transmission range of infectious diseases. The scale-free network is chosen as the topology of game as it is closer to the real society. After introducing social information into the individual decision-making, when the vaccination cost is kept to be a constant, it is found that large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases in the population will happen if individuals are excessively affected by social information. The individual heterogeneity is represented by the difference of individual characteristics, and individuals are divided into two types depending on the physical quality. Two types of individuals exhibit different possibility of recovery after they recovered. A large number of simulation results illustrate that the difference of individual physical quality should be controlled within a reasonable range. Otherwise, it will lead to the fierce increase of the peak and stable value of the transmission scope of epidemic.