The Impacts Of Elected Leaders And Appointed Leaders On Cooperation And Payoff

Aims: In our study,in the context of public goods games,we try to find out the impact of different leaders' selection ways on the group cooperation and payoff,and the impact on the tendency of leaders' reward and punishment behaviors.Moreover,we introduced leader compensation as a factor to our study and explore whether material incentives would affect group cooperation and the behaviors of different leaders.Methods: We used public goods game to explore group cooperation and leaders' behavior.Firstly,we explored the impact of different leaders' selection ways on the group cooperation,including the election-noncompensation treatment and the appointment-noncompensation treatment.Then,under the context of leader compensation we explored the impact of different leaders' selection ways on the group cooperation,including the election-compensation treatment and the appointment-compensation treatment.Based on previous experiments,we next explored how compensation to elected or appointed leaders affects cooperation and leader' behavior.Finally,we used the questionnaire to investigate the attitude and feeling of leaders and group members.Results: In this study,we conclude that(1)there is no significant difference in the cooperation level of group,payoff level of group and leaders' reward and punishment behaviors between the election-noncompensation treatment and the appointment-noncompensation treatment;there is also no significant difference in the cooperation level of group,payoff level of group and leaders' reward and punishment behavior between election-compensation treatment and appointment-compensation treatment;(2)no significant differences both in cooperation level of group and payoff level of group between the appointment-compensation treatment and the appointmentnoncompensation treatment;there is also no significant difference in cooperation level of group between election-noncompensation treatment and election-compensa tion treatment;but the payoff level of group in election-compensation treatment is significant higher than that in the noncompensation treatment;(3)compared with noncompensation treatment,the frequency of leaders' reward and punishment,the average intensity of punishment and the total intensity of reward and punishment are significant higher in the election-compensation treatment;compared with noncompensation treatment,only the average intensity of punishment is significant higher in the appointment-compensation treatment;(4)leaders and group members score more than intermediate value on the item that “reward produces positive emotion”;leaders score more than intermediate value on the item that “I prefer reward than punishment”,and there are no differences between treatments;(5)about leaders' collective interests,the scores of elected leaders are more than that of appointed leaders;besides,the scores of leaders in election-compensation treatment are significant higher than that in appointment-compensation treatment.Conclusions:(1)The determinant of cooperation and payoffs is the regulatory regime rather than the selection ways of leaders.(2)Both elected leaders and appointed leaders have the characteristics of preferring to reward rather than punishment because that reward can inspire cooperation,and this may result from the evolution of human social behavior.(3)The election method can inspire elected leaders' achievement motivation and they are more willing to show more reciprocity to organization so as to achieve the cooperation.(4)The approvement from other members will better regulate the behaviors of elected leaders,by contrast,the appointed leaders don't have this regulation.