The National Preferences And Roles Of Germany, France And Britain In TTIP Negotiations

U.S. and the EU officially launched Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) negotiations since June 2013, and until the end of April 2016, thirteen rounds of formal negotiations have been completed. The two sides have made certain progress regarding the three major parts of the negotiation, namely market access, regulatory cooperation and new rules about global trade and investment. However, the negotiation has reached a deadlock where the two sides are arguing over certain sensitive issues such as ISDS mechanism, harmonization of standards, government purchases. Given the important roles of the United States and Europe in the international economic system, the final outcome of the TTIP negotiations will not only be critical for the prospects of the U.S. and the EU, but will also relate to the development trends of international economic system. Thus, for other countries especially the largest developing Country, China, profound research on TTIP is of great significance.The body of the thesis includes four chapters and, different from other macro analysis of TTIP, the author of this thesis applies the tripartite analytical framework proposed by Andrew Moravcsik under his theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism to discuss the national preferences and roles of Germany, France and United Kingdom in TTIP negotiations. To make up for the deficiencies of other studies on research perspectives and time effectiveness, the author focuses on key member countries in EU and refers to large amount of literature and documents with time effectiveness.The first chapter introduces and summarizes the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism proposed by Andrew Moravcsik and the tripartite analytical framework under this theory. Besides, in the first chapter, the author demonstrates the explanatory power of the Moravcsik's theory on TTIP negotiation. The author concludes that the nation-centered analytical angle and the emphasis on economic interests of Liberal Intergovernmentalism can explain EU's positions and actions in TTIP negotiation. Furthermore, the tripartite analytical framework combines three stages, namely domestic factors, national preferences and game among governments, which can ensure that the analysis is logical, comprehensive and persuasive.The second chapter, based on the first level—the formations of national preferences, respectively analyzes the economic and geographic factors that influence the national preferences of Germany, France and Britain in TTIP negotiation. Regarding the analysis about each country's preference, the logic can be concludes as follow:First, generalizes the current situation and characteristics of the national economy so as to concludes the economic factors that shape the national preferences; Secondly, explain the geographic factors that affect the preferences from several angles; Thirdly, By exploring major interest groups and their interaction with their government to explain the process of national preference formation.The third chapter is based on the second analytical level which is intergovernmental negotiation to interpret the behaviors and games among governments during the TTIP negotiation process. On the one hand, the author refers to the related quantitative analysis of major think tanks worldwide in order to compare the expected benefits of Germany, France and Britain from the signing of TTIP, and the result shows that Britain will benefit most while the gain of France will be quite limited. On the other hand, the author elaborates the structural changes in EU after the European Sovereign Debt Crisis such as the rise of German, the downwardness of France and the stronger "brake" role of Britain. Then, based on the above comparative analysis, the author explains the three countries'willingness to compromise over sensitive issues like ISDS mechanism, harmonization of standards, and market access of certain departments during the Negotiation.The last chapter is based on the third level, namely the member states' willingness to transfer their sovereignty to European Commission, to analyze the dominant roles in TTIP negotiation. From several angles, the author interprets the limited power of the Commission and the decisive role of major member states like Germany, France and Britain. After all, the author predicts the future progress and final results of TTIP negotiation. Besides, in the epilogue, the author estimates the influence of the negotiation results on global economic system and rising countries especially China, and then proposed several measures for China to counter the negative influence of TTIP.