The Competitive Effects Of Discriminatory Patent License Fee Of Standard Essential Patents

Standard essential patent holders abuse market dominance,the implementation of discriminatory patent licensing fees for downstream enterprises will seriously undermine the market competition,but the standards necessary patents also have incentives to innovate and promote efficiency improvement side,the existing economic research results did not Criteria for the Necessity of Patent Discrimination.The competitive effect of patent licensing fees does not gives definite conclusions.The paper mainly adopts the standard essential patent bidding game model,the patent hold-up model and the vertical differentiated discriminatory license fee model.The pre-bidding mechanism is the stuck-up incentive-post competition effect-anti-monopoly illegal judgment and Incentive mechanism and competitive effect of the standard necessary patent discriminatory license fees,and on the basis of this,it puts forward some suggestions on standard essential patent antitrust policy.An Analysis of Prior Required Competition for Standard Essential Patents.Standards.The necessary discriminatory licensing fees are ex post market,but in high-tech industries such as mobile phone chips,the standard competition has been extended to the ex-market in the post-market,and the result of standard pre-competition may affect whether ex-post standard holders will adopt discriminatory licensing Toll.It is found that different patent categories have different effects on the standard essential patents.Standard essential patent hold-up and discriminatory licensing fees.Patent will become stuck with the standards of downstream enterprises,the collection of discriminatory license fees.But its stuck mechanism is not clear.Through the analysis of patent hold-up model,it is found that,after the patent becomes the necessary patent,the standard patent holder will stall the downstream enterprise and cause the discriminatory license fee.Although the existing FRAND principle can reduce the effect of lock-in,to a certain extent,Are not necessarily effective in eliminating discriminatory licensing fees.Standard Competitive Effect of Discriminatory Licensing.Discriminatory licensing fees raise licensing fees for low-cost and high-quality firms,reduce the production and market share of low-cost and high-quality firms,and distort downstream low-cost firmsand low-cost firms through the use of standard essential vertical differentiation of price discrimination models.High-cost enterprises,high-quality and low-quality competition between enterprises.In the context of quality differences,discriminatory licensing fees will eventually be transferred to consumers,resulting in consumer welfare losses,not only hindered the downstream product technology upgrades,but also hindered the final consumption of the market upgrade.Existing standards necessary patent discriminatory licensing fees antitrust policy there are many shortcomings urgent need to innovate the standard necessary patent antitrust policy system should be systematically designed standards necessary patent discriminatory licensing fees antitrust policy.First of all,should establish a perfect standard necessary information disclosure mechanism.The perfect information disclosure mechanism is an important way to solve the discriminatory license,and should solve the problem of information disclosure from both anti-monopoly law and standard necessary organization.Second,the standard necessary patent licensing fees should be based on the value of the patent itself.The standard essential patent license fee should be based on the value of the contribution of the patent to the downstream rather than the value of the standard itself.Third,the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies should avoid direct licensing fees.Since it is probable that the antimonopoly law enforcement authorities will not be able to take into account the factors that determine the reasonable license fee,a reasonable range can be determined based on the pre-judgment license fee and the reasonable profit margin to take account of the interests of both parties.Finally,the maintenance standards necessary to patent micro-free trading mechanisms are valid.Should pay attention to equal transactions under the standards necessary patent licensing between private negotiation,take the contract law to take precedence over the anti-monopoly law.