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Game Analysis Of International Anti-terrorist Cooperation Considering Multi-period Action Sequences And Defensive Decisions

Posted on:2017-07-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H W ZouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2336330512975730Subject:quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the 9·11 events,terrorism has become a major challenge faced by countries all over the world,and has a profound impact on the evolution of international relations and world politics since the beginning of the new century.Since the beginning of the 21st century,the growth of the number of deaths caused by terrorism has more than nine times,the trend of 162 countries terrorism detailed analysis found that due to terrorism death toll from 3329 in 2000 increased to 32685 in 2014.In 2014,the number of deaths caused by terrorism increased by 80%compared to the previous year.What's more,every violent terrorist activity will bring a painful death and endless fear to local innocent people.But year after year the trend showed the means of terrorist attacks terrorism upgrade,violent destructive enhancement,and reflects the fight against terrorism has a long,complex,sharp characteristic.With the increase in resources to strengthen anti-terrorism efforts and the form of a terrorist organization also become diversified,its organizational structure is becoming more and more strict,organizational control force strengthens,international terrorism activities showing a series of development trend,such as means diversification,the organization of complex,diverse and attacks "intelligent" and so on.No matter at home or abroad,most of the thesis is concerning the definition of terrorism,the political factors of terrorism,and the political and religious factors.From the point of view of traditional game theory,this paper considers the impact of international anti terrorist cooperation on the fight against terrorism,and analyzes the factors that affect international anti-terrorism and the necessity of strengthening international cooperation in anti-terrorism.Through three angles,this article attempts to use simultaneous game,sequential game and repeated game to analysis the international counter-terrorism cooperation efforts,and comparative,study simultaneous game scenarios and sequential game scenarios,confidential or exposure terrorist attacks defense system which is more favorable to the government.And this paper discusses the changes of the international anti-terrorism cooperation efforts to balance the impact of the cycle of terrorist attacks,from a theoretical point of view to study the importance of counter-terrorism cooperation.The specific research work includes the following three parts:First,considering the long term of international anti-terrorism,a theoretical model is established to solve the Nash equilibrium solution.From the long-term gains degree,the changes of the cost of terrorist attacks,the government of the target assets valuation,international counter-terrorism effort level changes and so on to analysis the equilibrium process and results of the multi cycle repeated game between the government and the terrorists in the international anti-terrorism cooperationSecond,consider the background of international cooperation against terrorism and the problem of resource loss,building the sequential game counterterrorism model to analyze the problem of international counter-terrorism cooperation.This considered the government and terrorism leading,using Stackelberg models scenario to solve the equilibrium.Then,on this basis,numerical analysis is conducted to study the impact of international government cooperation on the fight against terrorism with positive growth effort and negative growth effort(double standards).Third,taking into account the importance of international cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts,we analyze the impact of the international anti-terrorism cooperation on the construction of the defense system whether is exposed.If the defense system is exposure,the game for the two sides is a sequential game;if the defense system is secret,the two sides of the game is simultaneous game.Compared with the simultaneous game(security defense system)and sequential game(exposure defense system),the government's optimal solution is obtained.From the traditional game theory,this paper uses simultaneous game,sequential game and repeated game to analysis the international anti-terrorism cooperation efforts,provide a model explanation for the international anti-terrorism efforts and cooperation,and in some extent,the study also provides a useful reference on the related to counterterrorism variable changes impact on the fight against terrorism.The conclusion of the study for international governmental organizations develop disposal terrorism related matters,the necessity and the importance of the reasonable distribution of combating terrorism in the allocation of resources and take the initiative to fight terrorism,resettlement defense system offers a useful reference.
Keywords/Search Tags:terrorism, international cooperation against terrorism, double standards, Nash-equilibrium, emergency management
PDF Full Text Request
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