| It is common for share price slump in "crazy" in the national capital markets and collapse is often happened.At the beginning of June 2015,A stock market field in our country is now "thousand shares drop stop" and "the full wave red",which seriously damage the investors' confidence and interest.As a result,exploring the endogenous mechanism of stock price crash risk,and finding the management of stock crash has become one of the important issues of practice and theory.In essence,the causes of enterprise stock price crash risk are directly related to the "bad news" hidden in the process of business management.Once the accumulation of "bad news" is more than the critical value,it will focus on release,and severely influence enterprise shares.The core cause of producing bad news is opportunism motivation and principal-agent problems in the process of enterprise day-to-day operations(Kim et a1.,2011;Jiang Xuan Yu and Xu.,2015).The reasonable incentive contract design can effectively reduce principal-agent problems,but executive incentive is often set consists of a series of sub contract,and it is very important between the various sub contract structure rationality.Owing to incompleteness of the explicit compensation contracts,it often needs on-the-job consumption as alternative playing a role of the recessive incentive compensation.But over the years,our country enterprise on-the-job consumption level has been high,and is far beyond normal compensation executives."sky-high " on-the-job consumption appeared frequently,which cause our reflection:our country enterprise on-the-job consumption can really play a role of its implicit incentives,and reduce the risk of principal-agent conflict and thus ease share prices collapse or not? or on-the-job consumption itself was a measure of principal-agent problems,directly contributed to the crash?Based on principal-agent theory analysis framework,and using micro samples of listed companies,this paper studies the influence of on-the-job consumption for enterprise stock price crash risk,which includes both "implicit incentives" and "agency costs" dual attributes.We can get the following conclusions: First of all,as a whole,on-the-job consumption increased enterprise stock price crash risk level,embodied in the agency cost.This conclusion remains stable after treated with endogenous including Instrumental Variable Regression,Measuring Errors Adjustment,and Granger Test.Secondly,under different constraints of internal governance mechanism,it is different for on-the-job consumption for the effects ofstock price crash risk.Specifically,in the sample group of higher quality of non-state-owned enterprises group and internal control,higher supervision effectiveness,and more perfect dominant incentive mechanism,the negative impact of on-the-job consumption for stock price crash risk has been effectively suppressed,and no longer significant.In addition,after the shock incident,exogenous "anti-corruption" governance,this paper also found that the agency costs of state-owned enterprises on-the-job consumption properties obtained effective governance and which is no longer significant for negative impact on stock price crash risk.But private enterprises as a control group,and its working not too much influence consumer behavior.In theory,the research of this paper enriched to a certain extent the stock price crash risk factors research literature based on the principal-agent theory framework;According to practice,observing regulating effect of various types of internal and external governance mechanism for on-the-job consumption and stock price crash risk this path,helps regulators and enterprise itself targeted to optimize enterprise internal and external supervision mechanism and provides a certain direction to reduce and prevent stock price crash risk. |
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