Research On Abuse Of Market Dominant Position By Standard-essential Patent Holders

The modern world relies on technical standards,most of which involve Standard-Essential Patents(SEPs).To balance SEP holders' fair compensation with standard implementers' access to standardized technologies,standard-setting organizations(SSOs)generally require that their members commit to license their SEPs on a fair,reasonable,and non-discriminatory(FRAND)basis.In recent years,the communications industry has seen a growing amount of litigation concerning SEPs and FRAND in many jurisdictions.The high-profile Huawei v.ZTE is the most important European Union Court decision ruling on abuse of dominant market position by SEP holders',This is also the first European Union's case in which the court determined a lot of step about SEP's negotiating authority.Firstly,this article takes the case's judgment of Huawei v.ZTE in EU courts as the starting point and discussed the standard about the abuse of market ascendancy,further analysis how EU courts balance the relationship between anti-monopoly law and intellectual property law in the authorization of SEPs,the FRAND defense of the standard implementers and SEP holders may face with the constraints about abuse of market ascendancy of antitrust law after making FRAND commitments.Secondly,according to some remaining issues of Huawei v.ZTE,we have specifically discussed the abuse of SEP rights from the perspective of anti-monopoly,not only focused on the definition of the relevant market and market dominance position which related to the judgment standard of the abuse of market ascendancy,but also discussed Four behaviors about abuse of market dominance,including Abuse of the ban,Unreasonable licensing fees,Refusal of permission and Forced tying.Finally,from the three aspects of legislation,judicature and law enforcement,this article proposes the regulation of the abuse of market dominance of China's SEP holders.