Research On The Relationship Between Government Intervention,Sources Of Liabilities And Over-Investment Behavior Of Listed State-owned Coal Companies

Based on the assumption of a perfect capital market,traditional corporate finance theory suggests that whether an enterprise makes investment decisions depends only on the investment opportunities.However,there are still many deficiencies in real capital market.Company investment behavior often deviates from the right track due to the existence of some problems,such as asymmetric information.In recent years,the issue of overcapacity in China's coal and other basic industries has received a lot of attention.The overcapacity in the coal industry directly originates in over-investment.The over-investment behavior of listed state-owned coal companies is widespread,and the relationship between investment and financing should receive attention.However,most of the current researches are distributed in normative research,and it is difficult to fully verify their role.Government intervention is a powerful influence force in the coal industry.When exploring the relationship between over-investment and debt financing in listed state-owned coal companies,it is necessary to consider the possible impact of government intervention on financing environment,such as distortion of the capital factor market.Commercial credit and bank credit still dominate the debt financing of listed state-owned coal companies in China.Many studies in the early 21 st century revealed that because of the homogeneity in bank and state-owned enterprises,it is difficult for debts to constrain over-investment in state-owned enterprises.However,in recent years,China's state-owned enterprises and banks have undergone a series of reforms,and the introduction of multiple capitals will change the single property rights of banks,which is conducive to strengthening the hard constraints of banks.Under this background,This paper focus on the relationship between different types of debt and over-investment in listed state-owned coal companies,and the impact of government intervention on this relationship.Firstly this paper makes a theoretical derivation on the basis of the financing background and related classical theories,then constructs panel models and tests the hypothesis.The results show that:(1)Debt from different sources has different effects on over investment behavior of listed state-owned coal companies.Commercial credit is difficult to suppress over-investment with listed state-owned coal companies,and bank borrowings can effectively restrain excessive investment behavior;(2)Government intervention can significantly affect the relationship between commercial credit and over-investment of listed state-owned coal companies.Under the regulation of government intervention,commercial credit may also promote over-investment behavior.The constraint role of bank borrowings on the over-investment is not weakened by government intervention.In addition,empirical evidence is provided for government intervention to optimize the allocation of resources in the coal industry.Finally,based on the above research,there are corresponding policy recommendations as follows: Strengthen the protection of the interests of the company's creditors,such as the strict limited liability exception system,attach importance to creditors' rights in the bankruptcy and restructuring;The reform of the relationship between banks and enterprises has achieved a certain effect,continue to strengthen the governance of bank;reduce inappropriate government intervention,such as strict approval for grant,strengthening government oversight for officials' decision-making.