| Since 2014,as the central government has vigorously promoted the PPP mode,China's PPP project has reached a climax.By introducing private investor to participate in the construction of public projects,the government's financial pressure has been alleviated.And the efficiency of the private investor also has been fully made use of.Public-private partnerships have broad prospects.However,in the process of cooperation,as the private investor is inherently profit-oriented,it can lead to a series of adverse selection and moral hazard problems with the advance of practice,which seriously hinder the construction process of PPP projects.Therefore,effective incentive and supervision for the private investor plays an important role in promoting the success of PPP projects.This paper first expounds the theory of PPP,government regulation theory,incentive regulation theory,the principal-agent theory,and emphasizes the importance of government regulation and incentive.Then,the current situation of government supervision and incentive of infrastructure PPP projects in China has been analyzed,and existing problems in the supervision mode and incentive mechanism has been put forward.Next,this paper establishes the principal-agent incentive supervision model between the government and the social capital,and draws relevant conclusions through solving and analyzing the model.Finally,the simulation analysis is carried out,and some reference suggestions is provided for the government to effectively stimulate and supervise the private investor.In the first part of this paper,based on the principal-agent theory,the government's incentive and penalty function for private investors has been introduced,and a principal-agent model maximizing the expected income of the government has been established based on the participation constraint and incentive compatibility principle.Then,the optimal supervision and incentive levels of the government,and the optimal effort level of the private investor have been solved under different risk attitude of both parties.Finally,a optimal incentive supervision contract for the government has been designed.By solving the model,it is concluded that the different risk attitudes of the government and the private investor will have an impact on the expected earnings of each player in PPP projects.The government's incentives and supervision are effective,and the level of private investor'sefforts is positively correlated with the level of government's incentive and supervision.The government can encourage and supervise private investor to take higher efforts.When the government is risk-averse,it is willing to encourage the private investor to make good efforts by offering higher incentives.When the private investor is risk-averse,the government will reduce incentives to reduce the share of the private investor's profits.There is an optimal level of government oversight that would better encourage private investors to take more good efforts.In the second part,the relevant conclusions of the first part are verified through the simulation analysis of three principal-agent incentive supervision models under different risk attitudes of the government and the private investor.At the same time,it is concluded that the change of government's risk attitude will significantly influence the relationship between government incentive coefficient and the impact factor of the private investor's effort level on project performance through the comparison of simulation results.When the government and the private investor are both risk-neutral,the government's incentive coefficient increases monotonously with the impact factor of the private investor on project performance.However,when the government is risk-averse and the private investor is risk-neutral,the government's incentive coefficient decreases first and then increases with the impact factor of the private investor on project performance.The change of government's risk attitude will significantly influence the relationship between government supervision and the impact factor of the private investor's effort level on project performance.When the government is risk-averse and the private investor is risk-neutral,the government's supervision intensity will reduce with the impact factor of the private investor on project performance first,then increase.When government is risk-neutral and the private investor is risk-averse,the government's supervision intensity increases monotonously with the impact factor of the private investor on project performance.When the government and the private investor are both risk-averse,the government's supervision is monotonically decreasing with the impact factor of the private investor on project performance.In the third part,the relevant conclusions obtained by the principal-agent model and simulation analysis in the first two part are verified through the empirical analysis,and theeffectiveness of government incentives has been verified.16 incentives are classified and sorted from the perspective of principal-agent to analyze what can better encourage the private investor to take more good efforts.In the first level of incentive indicators,economic support and related policies and regulations support are of better incentive effect,project-related capital appreciation guarantee is of poorer incentive effect.Finally,according to the research model and the simulation conclusion,this paper puts forward the government incentive supervision strategy proposal under different risk attitude of the government and the private investor with the effect classification of incentive measures through empirical analysis.It provides useful reference value for the government to stimulate and supervise effectively.In view of the existing problems of "low supervision efficiency and repeated supervision" in the current situation of government supervision of PPP projects in China,this paper puts forward some suggestions to establish a comprehensive independent regulatory agency to improve the practical application value. |
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