Research On Board Powers Affect Firm Performance

Administration governance to economic governance is the development path of the evolution of our state-owned enterprises, and rights of ownership and management have been gradually achieving separation. Keeping deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and promoting their perfect modern enterprise system also was reaffirmed in Third Plenary Session of the 18 of China. SOE boards have always been regarded as the core of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, thus it is crucial to establish high quality and efficient board of directors. Chinese state-owned enterprises possess double features of economic and administrative nature, which determines the complexity of state-owned firms'board governance. At present, China SOE board has gradually reached the normative requirements of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in aspects of operational processes, governance structure, independent director system and so on, but the state-owned enterprises board governance is still inefficient. State-owned enterprises constitutes mode "administrative authority determining economic rights" to mode "administrative authority embedding economic rights" and then to mode "administrative authority supervising economic rights".Policy documents has not yet elaborated or clearly stipulates the basic problems such as the size of the board?the composition of the board of directors and so on. Besides, both domestic and foreign scholars study Governance of SOE boards mostly on structural characteristics from the board of directors, the nature of the definition, operation mechanism, respect the independence of the external governance, etc., and a handful of scholars study on board members from the perspective of power constitutes. In actual operation, the state-owned enterprises due to the different sources of the members of the Board of Directors, the Board of Directors constituted authority is also different. Therefore, this paper regards 801 state-owned listed companies as samples, manual collection 2010-2014 years' data of the representation of each listed company board members, including the number of directors who are Party secretary/ Discipline Committee/party secretary and other administrative-type positions as well, the number of directors who are also share-holders, the number of directors that serve as general manager/CEO and other business-type jobs and the number of independent directors. Methods of theoretical explanation, empirical analysis and comparative analysis of cases are used to analyze which mode mentioned above is more suitable for state-owned enterprises to achieve the economic goal and improve competitiveness.At the same time, the study of the performance of state-owned enterprises has always been a hot topic. From the equity ownership reform to the reform of state-owned asset secularization today are looking for the impact on business performance from the form of equity. "Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State Enterprises" clearly states: "State-owned enterprise reform should be conducive to increasing the value of state-owned capital, which will help improve the competitiveness of the state economy, and enlarge state-owned capital." State-owned enterprise reform is a long road, and state-owned enterprises carry long-term entertainment administrative color, thus it is difficult to establish exactly overnight into line with the modern enterprise system business. Therefore in this process, how to make better use of the state-owned capital to create a firm foundation for long-term reform of state-owned enterprises has become the top priority of the current state-owned enterprise reformation. So this article focuses on the state-owned listed company's operating performance. The government still holds a high percentage of shares in state-owned enterprises listed companies, which decides this paper further explores whether the different proportions of government ownership have an moderate effect on the relationship between the board composition and corporate performance power.From the research and analysis of this paper, we can draw the conclusion that power of board have a significant negative correlation, which means that the board serves as party secretary and other administrative-type positions of directors will reduce the interest of business performance. State-owned listed companies operating performance and the board of directors of the ownership positive correlation was not significant, which means an increase in the shareholding of the Board of Directors will not have much impact on the state-owned listed company's operating performance. Listed state-owned companies operating in the economic performance and the board right ? of management significant positive correlation, which means that the board serves as Managing Director and other administrative-type positions to promote increased business performance improvement. Listed state-owned companies operating in the economic performance and the board of directors right ? of management have a significant positive correlation, which means that an increase of the board of independent directors will increase business performance. In addition, the share ratio of state-owned has an significant-positive-moderate effect on the relationship between administrative power and corporate business performance, a significant-negative-moderate effect on the relationship between right of management and corporate business performance. Therefore, in order to improve business performance, the board of directors of listed state-owned power companies constitute the executive power to supervise should gradually shift economic rights. Government should appropriate delegation of authority to provide a basis for the transformation of the power board composition.