Study On The Differences Of Earnings Management Behavior Under The Refinancing And Delisting Regulations

The capital market cannot operates orderly without perfect regulatory policy,because the policy well regulates the behavior of listed companies.However,to some extent,it also induces the motive of earnings management at the same time,which leads to the problems of accounting information distortion and stakeholders' decision fault.Consequently,the issue of the earnings management behavior under the government regulation has become the focus of the scholars.The research focuses on the listed companies under the different regulatory nature,analyzing the earnings management behavioral differences under the refinancing regulation and delisting regulation.This paper adopts the methods of normative research and empirical research.Firstly,on the basis of regulatory differences and the behavioral characteristics of earnings management,the paper analyses the dissimilarity of earnings management behavior between the listed companies under refinancing regulation and delisting regulation,and from which the hypothesis are deduced.After that,the data about the listed companies which have had the secondary equity offering(including the secondary public offering and rights-offering)and have had special treatment from the year 2011 to 2015 are selected out as the study sample,and an empirical analysis is be made.The results show that:(1)the listed companies in China utilize the accrual earnings management as well as the real earnings management under the pressure of market regulation;(2)the companies which were under the delisting regulation had a higher degree of profit manipulation relative to the companies which were under the refinancing regulation;(3)the companies under the refinancing regulation are more inclined to adopt the real earnings management compared to the companies under the delisting regulation.Lastly,some policies and suggestions are put forward.The research results of this paper can contribute to rise the accounting information users' vigilance to make more rational decisions,and help the supervision department reinforce the monitoring of earnings management,and also can provide guidance for the future policy setting.