Based On The Perspective Of A Major Shareholder Related Transactions Tunneling

Since the establishment of capital market in our country,after 20 years of development,it has expended the size of the market from only 19 listed companies in the end of 1990 to total 2802 listed companies in city of Shanghai and Shenzhen in June 30,2015.The listed company has played an important role in promoting the economic development of our country.At present,our countries' capital market is perfecting itself and the market management is standard though,the discordant notes still exist which will affect the healthy development of capital market in China.Among these discordant notes,the tunneling behavior of the large shareholder for the listed company has cost a big problem in China's capital market which has been condemned a long time but failed to eradicate.The research idea of this article starts from the agency problem of the company.Setting the large shareholder tunneling behavior happened in *ST Danze affiliated transaction as a case and using the method of combining the theory analysis with a typical case to study the large shareholder tunneling behavior in *ST Danze affiliated transaction,the article introduces the meaning of the tunneling behavior and its affects and related theoretical basis simply.In the specific case study part,the article introduces the background of both parties in affiliated transaction and the happening path,influence factors and economic consequences of the large shareholder tunneling behavior basing on the affiliated transaction.It analyses the internal reasons and the external reasons leading to the large shareholder tunneling behavior,and puts forward corresponding preventive measures to avoid being tunneled by large shareholders.The article bases on the agency theory,corporate governance theory,and large shareholders tunneling theory,uses for reference of many scholars at home and abroad,and combines the our country itself characteristics of the capital market to get to study.This article is divided into six parts;each part of the main content is as follows:The first part introduces the research background and significance of this topic,and the related literature review,and then introduces the research ideas and methods.The second part is the introduction to the theory of large shareholders tunneling affiliated transaction.Firstly,it introduces the related meaning of large shareholders,and the concepts of large shareholders tunneling behavior and its means.Then,it points out the several means of tunneling affiliated transaction the large shareholder using often in the capital market.Lastly,it elaborates the agency theory,corporate governance theory,and large shareholders tunneling theory which are the basis of the whole article.The third part of the article is case analysis.It introduces the background of *ST Danze,and then illustrates the *ST Danze equity structure as well as the company's operating performance after listing,etc.It lists the means of tunneling behavior for *ST Danze by large shareholders and analyses the internal problems existing as well as the adverse consequences in the company.The fourth part of the article is reason analysis.It takes a deep analysis on the reasons causing the tunneling behavior for *ST Danze by large shareholders and gets start to deconstruct it basing on affiliated transaction internally and externally.At the same time,in order to avoid the recurrence of similar things,it provides some constructive advice.The fifth part is the inspiration getting from research conclusion and case.According to the results of above four parts analysis,it gives the advice of preventing large shareholders from tunneling the listed companies through affiliated transaction.For example,optimizing equity structure in order to realize the balance between shareholders,establishing,improving the company's internal control system,strengthening the supervision of government regulators,encouraging the supervision role play of the media and implement ting the information disclosure.The sixth part is conclusion.The main innovations of this article as follows: first,the selection of typical case.The case selected is a Taiwan enterprise which has a lot of differences comparing to the mainland enterprises and value in certain research.Second,the research view.Different from the previous research on large shareholders tunneling behavior,this article defines the research object as large shareholders tunneling behavior basing on the affiliated transaction which is obvious.Third,different from the simple research on large shareholders tunneling behavior from the internal governance structure and external governance environment as usual,the article takes the company's internal governance environment and its mechanism of action of each other into account.