Securities Market Environment、Political Relations And The Selective Execution Of Credit Supervision On Sponsor

Selective execution refers that regulators take different standards and treatments, selectively manage or punish the supervised. That is to say, regulatory agencies selectively enforce the law in time, space and extent. In the case of the legal system has been relatively complete, scholars are more concerned about the implementation of the law.At present, Chinese scholars have little research on administrative sanction on illegal sponsor took by China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) in the process of the sponsor credit supervision. This paper mainly studies the following two questions: the first, under different securities market conditions, whether there is Selective execution in the process of credit supervision took by CSRC on sponsor; the second, whether political relations will affect the Selective execution in the process of credit supervision took by CSRC on sponsor. Further, selective execution as an alternative mechanism on law enforcement in economic transformation, this paper examines its validity and economic consequences.This paper takes the securities companies that subject to credit supervision by CSRC as sample, conducts an empirical study on illegal punishment degree from the perspective of "credit supervision" of the regulatory agency. We found:(1)in the stock market downturn, CSRC less heavily fines the illegal sponsors in the fear of hitting market confidence. But, when the stock market is more active, CSRC more heavily fines the illegal sponsors so as to improve the quality of the securities issue;(2) Sponsors that have political relations receive a lighter punishment and longer time to escape punishment. we further found the market share of the sponsors is negatively correlated with the degree of punishment. As is that, The more severe punishment, the smaller its future market share.The conclusions of this paper provides a useful perspective to understand the status and effectiveness of the Selective execution of government regulation in transition economy.meanwhile they also enrich and improve the relevant literatures on sponsor credit monitoring under the control of the government.