Operation Game And Optimization Of Science And Technology R&D Subsidy Policy

In recent years, in order to enhance china's creativity, our government proposed innovation-driven strategy. "Recommendations for the 13th Five-Year Plan of the Central Committee on Economic and Social Development" put forward that we must firmly establish and implement the "innovation, harmonious and green, open, sharing" concept of development. Among them, innovation is the first of the five principle. The firms R&D activities is an important factor in promoting innovation. In order to promote firms R&D activities, the Chinese government carry out a large number of science and technology R&D subsidies for firms, achieving some results, but there are also some problems.In this paper, first of all, through a large number of science and technology R&D subsidy policy texts and literature reading and sorting out, we clearly expound the purpose of government science and technology R&D subsidy policy, the type of government science and technology R&D subsidy policy, and the movement mechanism of science and technology R&D subsidy policy; secondly, we use the method of game theory to build the multi-stage game of science and technology R&D subsidy policy between the government and the firms under the condition that the central government and local government having the same interests, finding the constraint conditions that influence the maximum efficiency of science and technology R&D subsidy policy prior to applying, in applying and after obtaining the R&D subsidies; finally, we can use computer simulation software to analyze the game results of the above three stages to verify the validity of the constructed model under the condition that the central government and local government having the same interests.Analysis shows that:when the firm packaging cost and expected risk cost is higher than expected R&D subsidies, and the gap between firm false application R&D subsidies and real application R&D subsidies isn't greater than the sum of firm false application packaging costs and the expected penalty after firm's false application behavior was revealed by the mass media, and the gap between the income gained by using the embezzled subsidy for the government designated purposes and the income gained by embezzling subsidy for other specific purposes isn't greater than the expected risk cost of the firm after the mass media revealed firm's embezzling behavior, government science and technology R&D subsidy policy will achieve the maximum efficiency. Therefore, In order to ensure the running efficiency of science and technology R&D subsidy policy, on the one hand, considering the packaging costs, government penalties and other objective factors in the rewards and punishments of policy, putting an end to the emergence of internal holes. On the other hand, considering strengthening the supervision of government and mass media, the supervision of government and mass media can produce effective checks and balances to corporate fraud.