Management Features And Information Disclosure Quality

Information disclosure of listed companies is the connection between information suppliers and demanders. The reliability and timeliness of information disclosure will directly affect the decision-making of investors and stakeholders. Therefore, it's of great significance to improve the quality of the information disclosure of listed companies. But in recent years, the violation of rules of information disclosure about the listed companies is frequent, which means that the information disclosure problem is serious and need to be solved further. On the factors influencing information disclosure quality, existed researches concerns less on the features of management. However, managers is responsible for the company's daily operations and may effect the information disclosure. Meanwhile, modern enterprises design all kinds of management incentives methods, in order to reduce the agency cost. Therefore, it's of great significance to find out the influence of management features on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. Firstly, this paper introduces domestic and international researches and establishes the content of this study. Second, based on the Signaling Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, the Upper Echelon Theory and Behavior Incentive Theory, it constructs theoretical model to explain the influence of management features on the quality of information disclosure. Then, it puts forward research hypothesis, selection of the variables and samples with empirical analysis. At last, this paper provides relevant suggestions according to the research conclusions.With standard research methods and empirical research methods, this paper selects data from Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2014 as samples. We find that the management features effect the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. Conclusions are as follows:(1) The level of management education and the currency incentives have positive correlation with the quality of disclosure information.(2) The age of management, the gender, the equity incentives and the control incentive have no correlation with the quality of disclosure information. The profitability and quality of internal control have positive correlation with the quality of disclosure information, the financial leverage has negative correlation with the quality of disclosure information, while company size has no correlation with the quality of disclosure information. According to the above conclusions, combining with the real situation of listed companies on small and medium-sized boards, this paper provides relevant suggestions: improvement of management's quality construction, improvement of management's incentive mechanism, improvement of internal control system concerning key business activities and strengthening the internal control enforcement, improvement of the responsibility mechanism of information disclosure.