The Influence Of Executive Audit Background On The Quality Of Information Disclosure

The quality of information disclosure of listed companies has attracted the attention of all circles for a long time.Good information disclosure quality can improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the capital market,and reduce the cost of external financing.Information disclosure is the core issue of the capital market.It is an important way to transfer its management status and financial situation to investors.The quality of information disclosure directly affects the healthy development of the capital market.But at present,because of the information disclosure distortion,illegal and even subject to the punishment of the relevant departments of China have occurred,the quality of information disclosure in the securities market is poor in our country's security market.The study of corporate governance rose from the 1990 s.Most of the existing literature draws some meaningful conclusions from the board of directors and board of supervisors angle characteristics,ownership structure of corporate governance factors on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,and rarely from the perspective of executives occupation background.The executives who have experienced may improve the quality of information disclosure because of its auditor experience with the occupation of prudence,but also may be more subtle use of their own financial fraud audit and accounting expertise and audit ability,thus weakening the information disclosure quality.The executives who have an important connection with accounting firm on the one hand may impair auditor independence,reduce the quality of accounting information of listed companies,on the other hand may provide a better quality of information disclosure because of avoiding the "threat of close relationship" will implement more stringent audit procedures and to improve the quality of accounting information.In view of this,this article based on the perspective of property rights,studying the impact of senior management auditor experience,the firm's Association on the quality of information disclosure respectively,in order to provide a theoretical basis on improving the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.This article select main board listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2014 as research samples,and establish models between executives' auditor experience,executives associated with firm relationship and the quality of information disclosure.According to the property right nature,the state-owned enterprises and non state owned enterprises are grouped into the empirical test by using multiple regression analysis.According to the research,we consider that:(1)The senior executives who have auditor experience have a significant negative impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.(2)Taking into account the nature of property rights,the whole sample is divided into two groups,the results show that,compared with the state-owned holding companies,the impact of non state-owned holding companies on the quality of information disclosure is more obvious.(3)The influence of the senior executives who have an important connection with accounting firm on the quality of information disclosure is not significant.