| The four daily activities of enterprises are financing activities,investment activities,fund operation activities and income activities.Among them,investment activities are the starting of enterprise financial decision-making and the foundation of future cash flow growth,which determine the survival of an enterprise.Investment efficiency is a indicator which can measure investment decision-making of an enterprise.When the size of the investment company deviate from the optimal investment scale,it will result in inefficient investment,then,underinvestment or over-investment will appear.In the modern enterprises,the separation of ownership and management rights,professional managers tend to make the enterprises bigger,then over-investment situations happen.However,some scholars believe that professional managers will pursue the maximization of private interests,when the company's interests and private interests conflict,it will lead to inadequate investment.As a result of the special ownership structure,corporate governance model and family members' involvement in the management of family businesses,the family business has become a serious problem of inefficient investment.Therefore,in this case,studying CEO,in particular,the type of external CEO on the family business impact of non-investment efficiency has a more important practical significance.At the same time,this paper finds that the existence of the separation of the two rights-cash flow and control rights,will also affect the level of inefficient investment,and,with the separation of the two powers increased,the external CEO type and family business inefficiency Investment relations are also strengthening.The paper focuses on when the top ten non-family natural person shareholders act as CEOs,the investment efficiency of family business,I also study the separation of the two rights(separation of control and cash flow rights).Then,the paper analyzes the influence of the separation of ownership and ownership on the relationship between the top ten non-family natural person shareholders and the family firm's non-efficiency investment level based on the two-power separation degree.(1)we use Richardson(2006)model to judge the inefficient investment level.(2)Based on the absolute value of the residuals of Richardson(2006)model as the dependent variable,the author establishes the motivational model to test the impact of the separation of the two powers and the top ten non-family natural person shareholders on inefficient investment in family listed companies.Then the author add the cross terms to analyze the inherent logic relationship of the two power separation degree,the CEO as the top ten non family natural shareholders and the non-efficiency investment level.(3)The paper divides the sample of the family listed companies into two sub-samples,which have the separation of two weights and the absence of the separation of the two weights.It is demonstrated that the CEO has the influence on the inefficient investment of the top ten non-family natural shareholders regardless of the separation of the two powers,but the degree of impact is different.Three conclusions are drawn:(1)Among the family-listed companies,there is a negative correlation between the top ten non-family natural person shareholders as CEO and the inefficient investment level;(2)In the family-listed companies,there is a positive correlation between the separation of two rights and the inefficient investment level;(3)With the increase of the separation of the two powers,the negative correlation between CEO and the non-efficient investment will be strengthened.This shows that the top ten non-family natural person shareholders served as CEO,reducing the family controlling shareholders and external small shareholders,between shareholders and managers of the serious principal-agent problem,the degree of asymmetric information and incomplete contract brings high costs Problem,thus reducing the family of listed companies in the level of inefficient investment. |
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