The Bank's Incentive Mechanism In Warehouse Receipts Pledge Considering The Effort Of Logistics Enterprises

At present,some small and medium-sized enterprises have limited access to the financial resources through the traditional way for the lack of sufficient real estate and good credit,which leads to the shortage of funds and the development bottlenecks in these enterprises.Under these circumstances,the pledge of warehouse receipts has been developing rapidly as an innovative financing service.In practice,there is always as certain rate of loss in the process of pledge,because the stocks are unstable and more susceptible to deterioration.However,in this process,logistics enterprises could play an important role of supervision and reducing the attrition caused by misconduct by providing the matching storing condition for the pledge and standardizing the regulation and supervising procedure.Therefore,it is significant and practical to find out what the banks could do to inspire the logistics enterprises to enhance the management and supervision.This paper studies the supply chain system between suppliers,retailers,banks and logistics enterprises,in which the retailers get a bank loan by utilizing the pledge of warehouse receipts,consider the supervision of the logistics enterprises in the warehouse pledge model to the collateral loss,and study the incentive contract between the supervision of logistics enterprises and the banks.First of all,this paper establishes the warehouse receipts pledge model under the influence of the monitoring efforts made by the logistics enterprises to the collateral damage.Assuming there is a certain loss rate in the retailer's default probability externally and the inventory,the bank's optimal pledge rate decision is calculated.After that,this paper theoretically and numerically analyzes the supervisory efforts of the logistics enterprises,the stock loss rate and the probability of the retailer's subjective default to the bank pledge rate and profit.The results show that raising the subjective default rate of borrowing enterprises,reducing the loss rate of collaterals and improving the supervision of logistics enterprises can bring an increase in bank profits.And in the case of the fixed borrowing enterprises and their collateral,compared to the former two,the ways to get more profits by encouraging the logistics enterprises to improve the regulatory efforts seem to be of more practical significance.First of all,discuss the principal-agent relationships between the banks and the logistics enterprises under this circumstance.Considering the loss of pledge caused by storing condition,temperature and environment change,this paper assumes that the logistics enterprises are of good risk aversion.Based on the Principal-Agent Theory,this paper studies the incentive between the banks and logistics enterprises through three different contract mode under both the condition of symmetric information and asymmetric information,the point of which is to study the banks incentive contract and the combining monitoring and incentive contract under asymmetric information.It is found that when the information is symmetric,the bank only needs to adopt the fixed payment model to make the supply chain reach the Pareto optimal.When the information is asymmetric,either the incentive contract or the incentive and supervision mode is feasible,in which,it is necessary for the logistics enterprises to provide fixed payment plus the proportion of the reward in order to achieve the incentive effect.Besides,the introduction of monitoring mechanisms can reduce the degree of asymmetric information,thereby increase bank profits.Finally,the paper analyzes the incentive contract of three modes,and discusses the relationship between the bank profit,pledge rate decision,the logistics enterprise risk aversion,the supervision cost coefficient and the supervision signal accuracy.The conclusion is validated by numerical analysis,and then the influence of parameters on decision variables is analyzed and explained.