The 1912 British-German Negotiations And The British-French Negotiations

Britain, whose hegemony had been being seriously threatened by other powers, especially from Germany, in the early1900s, was the largest colonial empire in modern history of world. Under reign of Kaiser William ?, a challenging policy towards present international orders was observed by Germany, which asserting "places in the sun". At the same time, Germany had been made utmost effort to strengthen its navy, by doing which it threatened Britain's naval mastery severely. An Anglo-German naval negotiation was carried through in1912, but failed for contrasting policy stances of both sides. Then an Anglo-French negotiation that focused on naval cooperation in Mediterranean arose. It laid foundation for Britain and France on fighting with Germany together by Grey-Cambon Letters, which agreed on consulting each other for whether the two governments should act together and what measures should be prepared to take in common. The present thesis tries to generalize British policy objectives during the two negotiations and evaluate their gains and losses by analyzing historical literatures.Four chapters can be divided as follows:Chapter one draws the outlines of the backgrounds of negotiations from international and domestic aspects of Britain. Continuous provokes from Germany gave rise to common need of defending Germany between Britain and France; while British domestic politics required a peaceful international surroundings in order to push forward internal social reforms.Chapter two reviews and analyzes Anglo-German negotiation. Germany persisted in Britain's promise on neutrality when war occurred between Germany and other powers as the prerequisite to slowing down its pace of naval construction. While Britain insisted on demanding Germany slowing down its pace of naval construction first, and then it would take Germany's political claim into account; and Britain resolutely refused unconditioned neutrality. The Anglo-German negotiation resulted noting in the end.Chapter three reviews and analyzes Anglo-French negotiation. France's anxiety about Anglo-German negotiation urged it to ask resuming Anglo-French naval negotiation repeatedly. At the same time, British navy felt short of fleet to defense Mediterranean since the loss of Anglo-German negotiation failed to loosen the tension in the North Sea. British cabinet decided to resume naval negotiation with France after debates. At last, Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary and Paul Cambon, French ambassador to London, interchanged letters to arrange that the two sides should have a consultation when international tension appears and whether the plan that military experts in both sides concerted should be put into practice.Chapter four first discusses British policy objectives during the entire procedure of negotiations with Germany and France, and then analyzes its impact on British foreign affairs and international situation. British policy objectives towards Germany can be generalized as three points:never allowing Germany to get naval mastery; never promising neutrality to Germany; trying its best to keep peace with Germany. British policy objectives towards France can be generalized as three points: preserving entente with France; never allying with France; taking limited naval cooperation with France in Mediterranean. The negotiations hadn't solved problem of striving for naval mastery between Britain and Germany and hadn't showed enough alerting to Germany's ambition of breaking war; the negotiations had kept spaces for Britain to stand by France against Germany in the later WWI; Britain couldn't realize all of its policy objectives and the freedom of policymaking it retain was only on cover paper.