Bank-enterprise Relationship,Internal Control And Inefficient Investment

The traditional theory holds that,due to the agency conflict between shareholders and management and the asymmetry of information in market economy activities,the management will make inefficient investment behavior that is contrary to the principle of efficiency,that is over-investment and under-investment,thus undermining the interests of shareholders and hindering the sustainable development of enterprises.At present,China is in a special system of emerging and transition economies,the rapid and steady economic development depends on the effective investment of enterprises.However,due to the inconsistency of objectives and information asymmetry,the private enterprises have formed complex principal-agent relationship,coupled with the low degree of market-oriented,there is a serious credit discrimination,the problem of inefficient investment of private enterprises is more and more prominent.Therefore,how to improve the enterprise's inefficient investment in the global resource shortage has become an important problem to be solved urgently.From the existing literature,the direct study of the relationship between bank and enterprise on the inefficient investment behavior is still not much,the existing literature on the relationship between banks and enterprises is mainly concerned with the relationship between bank loans.Based on the domestic and international literature,this paper is based on the principal-agent theory,the information asymmetry theory,the social capital theory and the relational financing theory,taking the data of private listed companies in 2010-2014 as samples,this paper discusses the influence of bank-firm relationship on the inefficient investment behavior,in particular,the paper introduces the mechanism of internal control,and deeply studies the different influence of the quality of internal control on the mechanism of bank-enterprise relationship and inefficient investment.This article consists of six chapters:The first chapter,introduction.This chapter first introduces the research background and motive of choosing the topic,then expatiates the research content and research ideas of this paper,then explains the significance of this paper,and summarizes the innovation of this paper.The second chapter,literature review.In this chapter,the author reviews the literature on the governance of inefficient investment,the influence of bank-enterprise relationship on inefficiency investment and the impact of internal control on inefficient investment,andanalyzes the contribution and shortcomings of the existing literature.The third chapter,theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.This chapter mainly elaborates the principal-agent theory,the information asymmetry theory,the social capital theory and the relational financing theory.On this basis,it analyzes emphatically the governance mechanism of bank-enterprise relationship,internal control to inefficient investment and the cooperative governance mechanism of inefficient investment,at the same time put forward the research hypothesis.The fourth chapter,research design.This chapter mainly analyzes and explains the selection of the sample,the source of the data,the measurement of the variables and the construction of the empirical model.The fifth chapter,empirical analysis.In this chapter,we take the private listed companies of A-share from 2010 to 2014 as the sample to carry on the regression analysis to the sample data,and then descriptive statistics,correlation analysis and regression analysis.The sixth chapter,research conclusion and policy suggestion.Based on the above-mentioned research,this chapter draws the conclusion of this paper,and puts forward some relevant policy suggestions on how to improve the non-efficiency investment of Chinese private enterprises,and point out the limitations of this paper.In this paper,we find that the problems of inefficient investment are prevalent in private listed companies in our country,and the phenomenon of under-investment is especially serious.The relationship between banks and enterprises can improve the under-investment of private listed companies,but it has little impact on over-investment.Internal control has significant effects on inefficient investment.Internal control and bank-enterprise relations can produce significant synergies to under-investment,but have no significant synergistic effect on over-investment.Finally,in view of the conclusions of this paper,the author put forward some relevant policy suggestions from two angles,with a view to provide useful reference for private enterprises to solve the problem of inefficient investment.First,speed up the pace of reform of banks and enterprises to build a normal,market-oriented relationship between banks and enterprises;Second,to further strengthen the internal control system construction and improvement,and strengthen supervision.