| Our country is in the economic transition stage at which external channel of financing for enterprises is relatively single,the bank loan has always been an important source of external funding.But in consideration of risk control,commercial banks mainly grant secured loans,i.e.,mortgage,pledge loan and guarantee loans,to the enterprises,which not only add to the enterprise financing costs,but also made corporations short of collaterals,especially small firms,hard to get bank loans.Additionally,ownership structure in Chinese listed companies are mostly concentrated,it thus leads to ultimate shareholders' separation between control rights and cash-flow rights,hereafter separation of two rights,which followed by a series of agency problems,such as occupy of interest by majority shareholders and earnings management problems.All these agency problems exacerbated the information asymmetry between enterprises and banks,and also increased difficulties for the credit availability.Based on this,this paper tries to research whether share holdings of institute shareholders can affect the relationship between separation of two rights and credit loan financing in enterprises.Bank loans are commonly classified into four kinds according to its nature:collateral,pledge,surety-ship and credit loans."Collateral and pledge" means that banks can control part of the firm's properties,"surety-ship" means that banks have recourse to guarantors,while "credit" means that banks can only depend on the firm's credibility.Risk-takers differ according to the nature of the loan,which leads to banks' different concerns for enterprises when making their credit decisions.For collateral and pledge,there are guarantors or collaterals for secured loans,and in case that the borrower fails to repay the loan,banks can ask the guarantors to repay it or enforce the collaterals sold by auction,which ensures the safety of the loan,therefore,compared to the information of the guarantors and collaterals,the demand for firms' accounting information is lower and consideration of agency problems is less.However,as there is no guarantor or collateral while offering a credit loan,bank officers need to care more about risk caused by agency problems of borrower enterprises and then analyze their accounting information comprehensively to reduce the risk to the bottom.It shows that the nature structure of loans will inevitably under the influence of the separation of two rights due to the agency problems caused by it.So it's necessary to study whether share holdings of institute shareholders who may act as efficient governors and signal transfers can affect the relationship between separation of two rights and credit loan financing.Under a background of the special system environment in our country,based on the corporate governance theory and the theory of signal transmission,set the relationship between separation of two rights and bank credit loan as our research object and listed companies during 2010-2014 in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as our samples,we exam whether governance function of institutional ownership can influence bank credit loan financing.And found that:(1)After controlling other factors which may affect bank credit decisions,separation of two rights will negatively affect the credit borrowing-under the same condition,enterprises with lower degree of separation of two rights will be able to obtain a higher proportion of credit loan.(2)Shareholdings of institutional investors can significantly affect the relationship between the separation of two rights and credit loan,specifically,for enterprises with an ownership structure of separation of two rights,more institution shareholdings can help them obtain higher bank credit loan.(3)The analysis of the nature of property rights shows that the separation between control rights and cash-flow rights will reduce the political cost but also increase the agency cost inevitably,the interaction between these two costs makes the separation between the two rights can't significantly affect the proportion of credit loan.In addition,the equity nature of state-owned enterprises can gain a recessive guarantee function which can weaken the relativity between separation of two rights and proportion of credit loan,and also the signaling role of institutional investors.While for the non-state-owned enterprises,there is a significantly negative relationship between separation of two rights and credit loan proportion,and a significant signaling role of institutional investors.This indicated that it is rather necessary for the non-state-owned enterprises which suffered more serious financing constraint to reduce agency problems so as to attract institutional shareholdings to help obtain credit borrowing.Innovation points of this article are as follows:different from other research which is mainly about the relation between separation of two rights and scale or term structure of bank loan,this article mainly talks about relationship between separation of two rights and the nature structure of loans,and exam the institutional investors' signaling role in the aspect of enterprises' credit loan financing behavior,thus enriched the research of related fields.In addition,considering the special institutional background in our country,this paper also distinguishes institutional investors' effect between different property natures;make the research content more comprehensive,more accord with China's national conditions. |
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