The Empirical Study On The Real Earnings Management Of Listed Companies Impacted By Institutional Investors

With the rapid development of economy,our country 's capital market become an important channel of social resource allocation.As the center of the concern of multiple stakeholders,such as corporate management,outside investors,creditors,and the government,enterprise's earnings situation increasingly aroused people's attention and in-depth study.For their own interests,management of listed companies will do a certain degree of earnings management,this will reduce the quality of accounting information,and influence the authenticity and reliability of accounting information.It will lead to the accounting earning information cannot objectively reflect the operating results of an enterprise,reduce the investor's trust of the accounting information,misleading investors to make investment decisions.It is not conducive for capital market toallocat resource and the stable and healthy development of social economy.With the development of Chinese capital market and the improvement of the financial system,the composition of China's institutional investors are increasingly diversified,the shareholding ratio are increasingly widening.Institutional investors become an important representative of our country.The investment behavior of institutional investors is professional and scale,so as to improve the ownership structure of listed companies,to participate in corporate governance,in turn,reduce the possibility of earnings management.A lot of domestic and overseas research results show that there are big differences between different types of institutional investors in the investment preference,holding period and the relationship between the invested entity,etc.So this paper reference the classification of Brickley et al.(1988),combined with the actual situation of our country,divides China's institutional investors into pressure resistance institutional investors and pressure sensitive institutional investors according to whether with the invested enterprises exist other business interests other than the investment relationship,in order to to explore related issues of the institutional investors and earnings management of listed companies by classifications.On the relationship between institutional investors and earnings management of listed companies,the existing literature mostly lock perspective on accrual earnings management research,but the reality is,listed company not only depends on the accrued profit manipulation to do earnings management,in order to make the information in the financial statements look more "perfect",the activities of the listed companies is more and more popular use real activity to implement earnings management,namely real earnings management,compared with accrued earnings management,real earnings management has more strong concealment,especially need attention of stakeholders.At the same time,as another important aspect of the ownership structure of listed companies,the controlling shareholder is bound to affect the enthusiasm of institutional investors participating in corporate governance.At present,in China's listed companies,"a dominant" is very common,if a listed company is in the first big shareholder's strong control,the first big shareholders enjoy absolute control,the other shareholders include institutional investors will be difficult to influnce thefirst big shareholders' behavior,which is not conducive to play a role of the supervisory management for institutional investors.Therefore,this paper,on the basis of existing domestic and overseas research results,through the theoretical and empirical test,analyzes the two kinds of institutional investors' impact on the real earnings management of listed companies;At the same time,combining with "a dominant" of the listed companies in China,this paper further study on the adjustment function on the relationship of the ownership concentration and equity balance degree,thus it is concluded whether that the different types of institutional investors can inhibit real earnings management,and whether the inhibitory effect is affected by the ownership concentration and equity balance degree,and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations and the further research direction.The empirical results show that:(1)the higher shareholding of pressure resistance institutional investor,the lower the degree of real earnings management of listed companies;(2)pressure sensitive institutional investor shareholding will not have a significant impact on the rate of real earnings management of listed companies;(3)the higher the ownership concentration is,the lower negative correlation relationship between pressure resistance institutional investor and listed company' real earnings management degree;(4)the higher equity balance degree is,the higher negative correlation relationship between pressure resistance institutional investor and listed company' real earnings management degree.