Resreach On Political Promotion And Merger Performance In Chinese Stated-owned Enterprises

With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises,the incentive mechanism of executives has become the top priority of the reform.Because of the state-owned enterprise executives have a special status,possessing “official”status,which also makes the political promotion become one of the key factors for the success of SOE reform.China's unique system of personnel exchanges between the government and the enterprise makes the state-owned enterprise executives have the dual identity of "entrepreneur" and "government officials".It is necessary for our country to formed the encouragement way to the state-owned enterprise executives--the political promotion incentive.There are two paradoxes in the process of corporate governance.On the issue of executive incentive in state-owned enterprises,there is a paradox between relatively low executive compensation and high performance growth.On the issue of Merger and acquisitions,the acquiring company actively implemented the M & A behavior and failed to create the wealth of shareholders and even the destruction of the paradox between shareholders' wealth.According to the existing research,there is no significant positive influence on the promotion of state-owned enterprises' capital appreciation,which indicates that the development of state-owned enterprises is still "scale oriented".The economic returns of state-owned enterprises have no significant impact on the promotion of state-owned enterprise executives,which indicates that state owned enterprise executives are more like government officials than professional managers.This paper studies the relationship between the executives of state-owned enterprises and political promotion incentive and the performance of mergers and Acquisitions:the executive assessment based on the standard of the demand of local government performance,this study provides a theoretical reference for perfecting the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises,in order to correctly evaluate the policies and measures of the reform of state-owned enterprises,especially provides a new analysis method selection with the effect of incentives,has certain theoretical and practical significance.Based on the previous research,the relationship between the political promotion,Merger choice,Merger size and Merger performance was discussed.By using the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companiesfrom 2004 to 2013,the results of this study are as follows: When the state-owned enterprise executives face higher promotion opportunities,they will make a merger.When the state-owned enterprise executives face higher promotion opportunities,as for opportunities of political promotion,the scale of Merger will be larger.When the executives of state-owned enterprises are faced with higher political promotion opportunities,the long-term performance will be relatively poor.The conclusion of this research not only enriches the relevant research results of political promotion and the performance of mergers and acquisitions,and provides some enlightenment for executives incentive problem in state-owned enterprise governance in practice,but also is helpful to the analysis of some state-owned enterprises,from the micro level to explain the dynamic China economy long-term stable development.